SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Adam Zuckman appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Garaufis, J.), granting the motions of defendants to dismiss his complaint challenging a levy • allegedly placed on his wages by the Internal Revenue Service. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review district court determinations on Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss de novo. See Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997).
Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). “In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 776 (2d Cir.2002). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Additionally, because Zuckman appears pro se, we are obligated to read his submissions with “special solicitude,” interpreting them to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest.” See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed Zuckman’s complaint.
We therefore affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its memorandum and order. Even liberally construing his pro se complaint, the claims raised by Zuckman do not satisfy the applicable pleading standards. Contrary to Zuckman’s contentions, the federal income tax is constitutional, wages are taxable income, and the Sixteenth Amendment removed the apportionment requirement for direct taxes. See, e.g., Ficalora v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 751 F.2d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir.1984).
To the extent that Zuckman challenges the levy on his wages, there is no indication that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Thus, the district court properly dismissed those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7422, 7429; see also Wapnick v. United States, 112 F.3d 74, 75 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam). We have considered Zuckman’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.