Richard MASSIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, Defendant-Appellee, 454 F. App'x 26

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Richard Massie, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment granting the motion of the Metropolitan Museum of Art (the “Met”) to dismiss as time-barred certain claims raised in his employment discrimination complaint and granting the Met’s motion for

summary judgment with respect to his remaining claim for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity . with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). Additionally, we review an order granting

summary judgment de novo and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom

summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a

summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93,100 (2d Cir.2002). Here, Massie has waived any challenge to the district court’s decision granting the Met’s motion to dismiss by raising such a challenge for the first time in his reply brief, see Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 91 n. 13 (2d Cir.2010), and has waived any challenge to the court’s decision granting the Met’s

summary judgment motion by failing to raise such a challenge in his objections to the relevant magistrate judge report, see Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.2003). Moreover, even if we were to reach the merits of the district court’s decisions, we would affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the magistrate judge in his thorough and well-reasoned reports.

The magistrate judge correctly concluded that any claims in Massie’s complaint based on the June 2004 or February 2006 charges that he filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights were untimely under the applicable 90-day limitations period. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The arguments in Massie’s reply brief challenging this conclusion are inapposite as they rely on his lack of knowledge of the alleged violations at issue, which is irrelevant to the limitations period applied by the district court. Additionally, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that the Met was entitled to

summary judgment on Massie’s retaliation claim because he failed to dispute the Met’s evidence establishing that there was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for his termination and subsequent reinstatement subject to a suspension; namely, his abandonment of his security post in April 2006. We have considered Massie’s other arguments on appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.