Sarah MURRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MITSUBISHI MOTORS OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., and Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, 462 F. App'x 88

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Sarah Murray appeals from an August 13, 2010, 2010 WL 3271506, Ruling and Order and a September 25, 2010 Order issued by the District Court for the District of Connecticut (Cha-tigny, J.) granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the action and denying plaintiffs motion, respectively, as a sanction for plaintiffs failure to comply with court orders. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]f a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery ..., the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders ... [including] dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). We review a district court’s imposition of sanctions under Rule 37, including dismissal, for abuse of discretion, and we review a district court’s factual findings supporting sanctions only for clear error. Friends of Animals, Inc. v. U.S.

Surgical Corp., 131 F.3d 332, 334 (2d Cir.1997) (per curiam). “A district court ‘abuses’ or ‘exceeds’ the discretion accorded to it when (1) its decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision — ■ though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding — cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Zervos v.

Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir.2001) (footnote omitted). “Several factors may be useful in evaluating a district court’s exercise of discretion to dismiss an action under Rule 37. These include: (1) the willfulness of the non-compliant party or the reason for noncompliance; (2) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the duration of the period of noncompliance, and (4) whether the non-compliant party had been warned of the consequences of noncompliance.” Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortg. Corp., 555 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

In this case, Murray does not appear to challenge the district court’s findings that: she was required to provide a damages analysis by June 15, 2009 and to disclose expert reports by August 15, 2009; she did not comply with either deadline or seek an extension of time; that she represented to the district court during a September 15, 2009 telephone conference that her experts would be disclosed within four weeks, but nonetheless failed make her promised disclosure; she continued to ignore the court’s orders despite the court’s warning on February 10, 2010 that further noncompliance could result in dismissal of the action; and she remained noncompli-ant for an entire year, when the district court finally granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Murray v. Mitsubishi Motors of N. Am., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-1729(RNC), 2010 WL 3271506, *1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84921, at *3 (D.Conn. Aug. 13, 2010). This undisputed record amply supports the district court’s conclusion that each of the relevant factors weighed in favor of dismissal: Plaintiffs failure to disclose experts and provide a damages analysis prejudice the defendants by preventing them from preparing a defense to her claims. Her noncompliance with the tailored scheduling order is not inadvertent. She has been in noncompliance for a year, despite reminders that her disclosures were overdue.

Plaintiffs counsel was warned by the Court six months ago that continued noncompliance could result in dismissal.... Accordingly, the motions to dismiss are hereby granted. Id. We agree, and conclude that the district court acted well within its discretion in granting defendants’ motions to dismiss. Additionally, the district court initially dismissed the case without prejudice to allow Murray to move to reopen if she filed the long overdue disclosure and damages analysis. Murray again ignored the court’s instructions, filing a motion to reopen without the required expert disclosure.

Accordingly, to the extent Murray challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to reopen pursuant to Rule 60(

b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we affirm that decision as a proper exercise of the district court’s discretion. See Maduakolam v. Columbia Univ., 866 F.2d 53, 55-56 (2d Cir.1989) (affirming denial of Rule 60(

b) motion because of plaintiffs “dilatory” conduct). While we have decided this case on the merits, we further note that there are severe problems with Murray’s brief, which, in themselves, would warrant dismissal of the appeal. See Jin Bao Jiang v. Gonzales, 187 Fed.Appx. 56, 57 (2d Cir.2006) (summary order). Rule 28(

a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the appellant’s brief must contain “a statement of facts relevant to the issues submitted for review with appropriate references to the record,” as well as an argument, which itself must specify “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(7), (9)(A). See also Changming Ren v.

Board of Immigration Appeals, 288 Fed.Appx. 771, 772 (2d Cir.2008) (summary order) (“Petitioners seeking judicial review have an obligation to present their arguments clearly and to support them with citations to relevant legal authority and record evidence.”). The requirements set forth in Rule 28(

a) are mandatory, and noncompliance warrants dismissal of the appeal. See Sioson v. Knights of Columbus, 303 F.3d 458, 459-60 (2d Cir.2002) (per curiam); Ernst Haas Studio, Inc. v. Palm Press, Inc., 164 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir.1999). In this case, Murray’s brief borders on the incomprehensible. She cites not a single case to support any of her arguments, nor does she cite any statutory authority. Indeed, the only citations in the entire brief appear on the first page, where Murray incorrectly asserts that the jurisdiction of this court “is invoked pursuant to: federal 26(

f) and rule 37(

b) of the case.” Pl.’s Br. 1. The brief consists of little more than an emotional appeal to this Court to ignore her repeated failings below because neither she nor her lawyer are wealthy. Because we have determined that this appeal must be dismissed for two independent reasons, we need not consider the additional grounds offered by the defendants on which we may affirm the district court’s decision. We have considered Murray’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.