Edison Ignacio LLANOS-FERNANDEZ, a/k/a Edison Jara-Fernandez, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 464 F. App'x 37

SUMMARY ORDER Edison Ignacio Llanos-Fernandez, a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of an August 3, 2010, order of the BIA affirming the November 9, 2009, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Michael W. Straus, denying his application for adjustment of status and waiver of inadmissibility. In re Llanos-Fernandez, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 3, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig.Ct.Hartford, Conn., Nov. 9, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision, emphasizing particular aspects of that decision without rejecting any of its reasoning, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Singh v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir.2006). We generally lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of an adjustment application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); Ling Yang v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 278, 279-80 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam).

However, we retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional claims or questions of law, such as an IJ’s determination that an alien is statutorily ineligible to adjust his immigration status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59, 62-63 (2d Cir.2005) (an alien’s statutory eligibility for relief is a question of law). When the IJ denies an adjustment application based on both eligibility and discretionary reasons, the discretionary reason will bar review if it is based on factors independent from the IJ’s eligibility determination. See Ling Yang, 514 F.3d at 280.

Llanos-Fernandez contends that the IJ erred by finding him ineligible to adjust his immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident pursuant to § 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Although the IJ found that Llanos-Fernandez was ineligible for adjustment of status, the IJ also denied the application in the alternative as a matter of discretion.

He based his discretionary denial on independent grounds, including the seriousness of Llanos-Fernandez’s criminal convictions, Llanos-Fernandez’s other criminal conduct for which he was not convicted, and the lack of evidence that he had been rehabilitated. Because the IJ’s discretionary denial was based on factors independent from his eligibility determination, “including criminal conduct for which [Llanos-Fernandez] was not convicted, .... we lack jurisdiction over this determination.” Ling Yang, 514 F.3d at 280. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED.

As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.