UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Joseph IORIO, Defendant-Appellant, 465 F. App'x 60

SUMMARY ORDER Joseph lorio (“lorio”) appeals from a conviction, following a jury trial, for five counts of mail and wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. Iorio argues that the court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, and his motion for a new trial, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 33.

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. “[W]e review de novo the denial of a Rule 29 sufficiency challenge, ... [and] we view th[e] evidence in the light most favorable to the government, assuming that the jury resolved all questions of witness credibility and competing inferences in favor of the prosecution.” United States v.

Abru-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 134 (2d Cir.2010) (citations omitted). ‘Where a defendant’s Brady claim was raised in a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 ... we review the denial of the motion for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 245 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The elements of mail or wire fraud are (

i) a scheme to defraud (ii) to get money or property, (iii) furthered by the use of interstate mail or wires.” United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2000). Iorio’s scheme relied on Yonkers Contracting Company (“YCC”) winning a contract based on an inflated subcontract bid from Leticia, Inc., and therefore on Leticia Rojas not submitting market-rate bids to YCC’s competitors. Rojas’s submission of inflated bids to the competitors — leveling the playing field with YCC — was therefore in furtherance of Iorio’s scheme. See Schmuck v.

United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (“[T]he use of the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme. It is sufficient for the mailing to be incident to an essential part of the scheme or a step in [the] plot.” (second alteration in original; citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v.

Keats, 937 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir.1991) (“That there was a slight variation in the methodology used to achieve [the ultimate goal of the scheme] does not negate the fact that the ... telephone call was placed for the purpose of furthering [the] scheme.”). “A Brady violation occurs only where there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that a different verdict would have resulted from disclosure of the information that the defendant claims was suppressed.” United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 227 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). lorio does not show he was prejudiced by any delay in the government’s disclosure of evidence that Rojas inflated her bids by only twenty-five cents per ton. Neither does he show a “reasonable probability that earlier disclosure” of the material that the government disclosed on September 10 and 14 “would have produced a different result at trial.” See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir.2001); see also Douglas, 525 F.3d at 245-46.

Finally, in light of the government’s other disclosures impugning Rojas’s credibility, lorio shows no prejudice from the government’s failure to disclose the report of Rojas’s interview before the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. Finding no merit in Iorio’s remaining arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.