Jorge Alberto HIDALGO, aka Jorge Hidalgo Duran, aka Roberto Camacho, aka Roberto Cumacho, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 471 F. App'x 18

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner Jorge Hidalgo, a native and citizen of Venezuela, seeks review of a May 17, 2010, order of the BIA affirming the June 12, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Robert D. Weisel denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jorge Alberto Hidalgo, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 17, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 12, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA’s decision. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157-58 (2d Cir.2008); Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008). Because Hidalgo does not challenge the IJ’s denial of a continuance or the agency’s denial of CAT relief, we address only the agency’s denial of CAT relief, we address only the agency’s pretermission of asylum and denial of withholding of removal.

See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005) (providing that issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal). Hidalgo argues that the BIA erred in its review of the IJ’s pretermission of his asylum application. Although our review over the agency’s pretermission of asylum applications is limited, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), we have jurisdiction to address whether the BIA applied the correct standard of review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (providing that courts retain jurisdiction to review questions of law); Wallace v.

Gonzales, 463 F.3d 135, 140-41 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (exercising jurisdiction to address whether the BIA violated regulations and applied the wrong standard of review). However, we detect no error in the BIA’s review, as the record indicates that it followed the relevant regulation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3), and applied the correct standard of review, considering the IJ’s legal analysis de novo and factual issues for clear error.

Hidalgo also argues that the agency erred in denying his application for withholding of removal, asserting that he established a pattern or practice in Venezuela of persecution against homosexuals and individuals who are HIV positive. As an initial matter, the BIA was not required to give any weight to this Court’s decision in Morett v. Gonzales, 190 Fed.Appx. 47, 49 (2d Cir.2006) (unpublished), or an IJ’s grant of asylum to a gay man from Venezuela on a similar claim, because they were unpublished decisions based on different records from that in Hidalgo’s case. See Ajdin v.

Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 437 F.3d 261, 264-65 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the BIA is not bound by its unpublished decisions in similar cases, since “unpublished opinions of the BIA have no precedential value”). Although the agency has not articulated a standard explaining how it evaluates pattern or practice claims, here, as in Santoso v.

Holder, 580 F.3d 110 (2d Cir.2009) (per curiam), we are able to review the BIA decision because “the BIA explicitly discussed the pattern or practice claim and the record includes substantial documentary evidence regarding the conditions in petitioner’s homeland,” id. at 112 n. 1. The agency considered Hidalgo’s evidence of discrimination and persecution against homosexuals in Venezuela, but concluded that it did not establish that persecution was “systemic, pervasive, or organized,” see In re A-M-, 23 I. & N.

Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A.2005), noting the contrary evidence that there was a thriving gay community in Caracas and that non-governmental organizations were working in the country to protect gay rights. Even if we would (or could) have drawn a different conclusion, we cannot find that the agency erred in its analysis of the sufficiency of Hidalgo’s evidence as he presented no evidence compelling the conclusion that he would more likely than not be subjected to persecution in Venezuela.

As this Court has stated, “[wjhere there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Rather, a reviewing court must defer to that choice so long as the deductions are not illogical or implausible.” Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Hidalgo did not establish a likelihood of future persecution if returned to Venezuela, and the denial of his application for withholding of removal.

See Santoso, 580 F.3d at 112; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.