Joseph R. ERCOLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ray LaHOOD, Secretary of the Department of Transportation, AKA Mary E. Peters, Defendant-Appellee, United States Department of Transportation, Defendant, 472 F. App'x 47

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Joseph R. Ercole, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims in Ercole’s third amended complaint, which were brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq., the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., and

Article 15 of the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-301. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. This Court reviews “de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002).

To avoid dismissal, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). While pro se complaints must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the plausibility standard, a court should look for such allegations by reading pro se complaints with “special solicitude” and interpreting them to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam).

Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its order dated March 29, 2011, which also incorporated, in part, the district court’s orders dated September 10, 2008, and March 30, 2010. We have considered all of Ercole’s remaining arguments,- including his arguments that the district court should have allowed discovery, and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.