SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Tormu E. Prall, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s decision to award
summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Appellees and to dismiss his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. This Court reviews orders granting
summary judgment de novo and focuses on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir.1995)).
Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On appeal, Prall does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his claims regarding the alleged violation of state and federal criminal statutes, and he has therefore abandoned any such arguments. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995).
As to the remainder of his claims, after an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude for substantially the reasons articulated by the district court in its well-reasoned order that the district court properly granted
summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed Prall’s complaint. We have considered Prall’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED, and Prall’s “motion for rule 2 relief’ is DENIED.