HUIRONG CHEN, Fa Qin Sun, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 480 F. App'x 598

SUMMARY ORDER Huirong Chen and Fa Qin Sun, natives and citizens of China, seek review of a January 28, 2011 decision of the BIA affirming the January 7, 2009 decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Huirong Chen and Fa Qin Sun, Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/170 (B.I.A. Jan. 28, 2011), aff'g Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/170 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 7, 2009).

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision. We have reviewed the IJ’s opinion as supplemented and modified by the BIA’s decision, excluding the portions of the IJ’s decision not relied upon by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 379 (2d Cir.2007).

On appeal to the BIA, petitioners failed to challenge the IJ’s denial of relief sought by Petitioners based on Chen’s Christian faith or political activities in the United States. Accordingly, we address only the denial of relief requested based on Chen’s claim that she suffered a forced abortion. See Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir.2004). We conclude that the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and is dispositive.

We “defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008).

For asylum applications governed by the REAL ID Act, such as this one, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of her account, and inconsistencies in her statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. On several occasions, Chen gave non-responsive answers to key questions, and several questions had to be repeated numerous times before she gave a responsive answer.

We give particular deference to an IJ’s observations regarding an applicant’s demeanor. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005). The demeanor Ending in this case was supported by multiple specific instances of non-responsive testimony. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.2006). Petitioner’s argument that her lack of education explains her non-responsive answers is not persuasive. The questions asked of her were about her own personal experiences. Further, there was no evidence to support her passing assertion that she may suffer from mental retardation.

We will not overturn an adverse credibility finding absent record evidence that compels reversal, Majidi, 430 F.3d at 79-80, and this record is barren of such evidence. Further, although Petitioner argues that the agency erred in applying the adverse credibility finding it made regarding Petitioner’s religious and political activity claims to her forced abortion claim, this Court has held that “a single false document or a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.” Siewe v.

Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir.2007). We also find no error in the agency’s finding that Chen’s failure to supply corroboration of her claims supported the adverse credibility determination. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam). The decision to afford the letter from Chen’s mother limited weight was likewise within the agency’s discretion. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006).

Further, Chen’s argument that the BIA improperly applied a de novo standard of review to the IJ’s fact-finding is without merit, as the BIA expressly applied the proper “clearly erroneous” standard set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.

Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). . We address only those findings affirmed by the BIA and do not reach the finding that the BIA expressly declined to address, t.e., the finding related to Chen's testimony regarding the type of abortion she underwent. See Xue Hong Yang, 426 F.3d at 522.