John MONACHINO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sheila BAIR, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, 481 F. App'x 20

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff appeals from the district court’s grant of

summary judgment which was entered on February 3, 2011, consistent with the decision and order dated February 1, 2011, on plaintiffs suit alleging discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review. “We review a district court’s grant of

summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Kuebel v. Black & Decker, Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir.2011). However, where, as here, “no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of

summary judgment is proper.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994). We conclude that the district court properly granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The district court appropriately concluded that it need not determine if the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of retaliation under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

We need not reach the question of whether Monachino satisfied his initial burden because the FDIC has met its burden to present legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the employment actions at issue, and Monachino has failed as a matter of law to produce sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the proffered reasons are pretextual. See Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir.2001). Assuming a prima facie case, the FDIC then had the burden of “articulat[ing] a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Hicks v.

Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The FDIC presented ample evidence of legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for all of the adverse actions alleged by the plaintiff, and thus the burden shifted back to Mona-chino to “point to evidence sufficient to permit an inference that the employer’s proffered non-retaliatory reason[s] [were] pretextual and that retaliation was a’ substantial reason for the adverse employment action[s].”’ Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 553 (2d Cir.2010) (citation omitted).

Monachino’s attempted reliance on temporal proximity to demonstrate pretext was insufficient. While “temporal proximity of events may give rise to an inference of retaliation for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, ... without more, such temporal proximity is insufficient to satisfy appellant’s burden to bring forward some evidence of pretext.... Indeed, a plaintiff must come forward with some evidence of pretext in order to raise a triable issue of fact.” El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir.2010).

The rest of Monachino’s evidence of pretext failed to overcome his burden of persuasion under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.