Marcia COHEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of NEW YORK, New York Department of Taxation, New York Commission on Judicial Conduct, Columbia County, New York, Columbia County Board of Supervisors, Columbia County Attorney, Defendants-Appellees, 481 F. App'x 696

SUMMARY ORDER Marcia Cohen appeals pro se from the dismissal of her claims against New York State, as well as various state and local authorities, for alleged constitutional injuries sustained in the course of her state divorce proceedings. We review de novo the challenged dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, see Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997), affording plaintiffs pro se submissions a “liberal reading,” Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir.2005).

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm, a conclusion we reach for substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in its well-reasoned Memorandum Decision. At the outset, we note that Cohen has forfeited any claims against the Columbia County defendants by failing to argue those claims on appeal. See Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 95 (2d Cir.2009).

As to the remaining defendants, Cohen primarily submits that fraud perpetrated on the divorce court, including the submission of “usurious” figures in connection with a foreclosure, voided the proceedings. This fraud claim is meritless, given that the “usurious” figures she references were corrected. In any event, Cohen’s claim for alleged injuries resulting from “unlawful” state foreclosure is barred from district court review by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as is the claim that Cohen was denied due process by the court’s denial of her request for a divorce. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty.

Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir.2005) (explaining that Rook-er-Feldman doctrine bars “ ‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments’ ” (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005))).

To the extent Cohen asserts an “independent claim” of fraud that was “never litigated” previously, the alleged perpetrators are not parties to the action and, in any event, Cohen’s assertions of fraud do not overcome the sovereign immunity that otherwise precludes her claims against the State of New York and its Department of Taxation and Commission on Judicial Conduct. See In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 617 (2d Cir.2007) (listing exceptions to sovereign immunity afforded agencies and arms of New York State).

Finally, because Cohen did not present a recusal claim in her amended complaint, raising it only in her opposition to the motion to dismiss, the district court was not required to consider it. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.1998). In any event, Cohen fails to allege the “extreme facts” necessary to support a claim of judicial bias that “rises to an unconstitutional level.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 886-87, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.