Isaac STENGEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bradford BLACK, Defendant-Appellee, 486 F. App'x 181

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff Isaac Stengel, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his complaint for, among other reasons, lack of personal jurisdiction. Stengel’s complaint alleged that defendant Bradford Black violated various federal criminal statutes in purchasing a diamond in Ohio from a third person who had purchased it from Stengel in New York using a fraudulent check. Black separately moves this court to impose sanctions against Stengel pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 38. We review de novo the dismissal of an action for lack of personal jurisdiction, see Licci ex rel. Licci v.

Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir.2012), and the district court’s application of principles of res judicata, see Joseph v. Athanasopoulos, 648 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir.2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and record of prior proceedings, referencing them only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

In reviewing Stengel’s challenge to the district court’s adverse determination as to personal jurisdiction, we are mindful that on three prior occasions, New York federal and state courts have dismissed Stengel’s claims arising out of the same facts alleged here, concluding that New York’s long-arm statute, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a), does not authorize courts sitting in New York to assert personal jurisdiction over Stengel’s claims against Black, a resident of Ohio, arising out of Black’s Ohio diamond purchase, see, e.g., Stengel v.

Black, 28 A.D.3d 401, 813 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1st Dep’t 2006). “It has long been the rule that principles of res judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations — both subject matter and personal.” Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). Although a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits of a claim, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), such a dismissal precludes re-litigation of the issue it decided.

Stengel does not claim that the facts relevant to Black’s amenability to New York long arm jurisdiction have changed since the prior cases were decided. Accordingly, the district court correctly held that decisions in Stengel’s earlier cases precluded it from exercising personal jurisdiction over Black on Stengel’s claims arising out of the same facts.

With respect to Black’s motion to sanction Stengel for filing a frivolous appeal, we note, that the district court has sanctioned Stengel under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 for his conduct in the district court and is currently deciding the amount of the sanction it will impose. Under these circumstances, it is preferable for all sanctions issues to be decided in a single proceeding. Accordingly, Black’s motion to sanction Stengel is DENIED with leave to renew that motion in the district court.

Should Black move in the district court to sanction Stengel for filing this appeal, the district court would be authorized to decide whether Stengel’s appeal was frivolous and, if so, the appropriate sanction. Cf. Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir.2012) (expressing appellate court’s preference “that district courts not sanction parties for filing frivolous appeals,” but declining to adopt rule prohibiting such sanctions). We have considered Stengel’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.