Orrin Lynn TOLLIVER, Jr., a.k.a. David Payton, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Louis McCANTS, d.b.a. Jimi Mac Music, d.b.a. OG Music, Defendant-Appellant, 486 F. App'x 902

SUMMARY ORDER Defendant James McCants appeals pro se from an award of

summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Orrin Lynn Tolliver, Jr., on the issue of McCants’s liability for copyright infringement. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 1. Jurisdiction As an initial matter, Tolliver argues that we lack jurisdiction to review McCants’s challenge to the district court’s March 25, 2009 order because his notice of appeal only expressly referenced the district court’s January 21, 2010 order.

Although the requirement that a notice of appeal must “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed” is jurisdictional, Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B); see Gonzalez v. Thaler, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 641, 651-52, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012), “we construe notices of appeal liberally, taking the parties’ intentions into account,” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995). Our appellate jurisdiction “depends on whether the intent to appeal from [a] decision is clear on the face of, or can be inferred from, the notice[ ] of appeal,” New Phone Co. v.

City of N.Y., 498 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir.2007), a rule that is itself subject to the particular liberal application that pertains to pro se filings, see, e.g., Phelps v. Kapnolas, 123 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir.1997). Attached to McCants’s notice of appeal was a letter stating that he was challenging the “judgment” against him. At the time, the only “judgment” against McCants was a partial judgment as to liability, and the district court’s reasoning for finding such liability established as a matter of law was encompassed in both its March 2009 and January 2010 orders.

In these circumstances, McCants’s notice of appeal can reasonably be construed as expressing an intent to appeal from all aspects of the district court’s decision regarding liability, whether reflected in the March 2009 or the January 2010 orders. Accordingly, we have appellate jurisdiction to review both decisions. 2. Merits Reviewing the

summary judgment award de novo, see Wilson v. C.I.A., 586 F.3d 171, 183 (2d Cir.2009), we identify no error. Under the Copyright Act, ownership of a copyright “vests initially in the author or authors of the work.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). “It is elementary that the lawful owner of a copyright is incapable of infringing a copyright interest that is owned by him; nor can a joint owner of a copyright sue his co-owner for infringement.” Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir.1984). .

Copyright ownership may be transferred in whole or in part, see 17 U.S.C. § 201(d), but for a transfer to be valid, the conveyance must be “in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed,” id. § 204(a). Insofar as McCants appears to argue that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether he is a coauthor of the composition, he arguably waived this contention, alluded to in his answer, by abandoning the position in his district court motion papers in favor of an ownership-by-assignment argument. See Eastman Kodak Co. v.

STWB, Inc., 452 F.3d 215, 221 (2d Cir.2006) (“[Tjhis Court ordinarily will not hear arguments not made to the district court.”). In any event, the co-authorship argument is without record support. At his deposition, McCants admitted that Tolliver wrote the lyrics to the composition and that McCants did not personally make any contribution to the writing of the composition. The record also belies MeCants’s contention that he entered into two written agreements with Tolliver that transferred partial ownership of Tolliver’s copyright to McCants.

At his deposition, McCants testified to having only one written contract with Tolliver, an artist contract, and he consistently maintained that his “understanding” with Tolliver regarding the transfer of ownership rights in the composition was based on a verbal agreement. McCants Dep. at 153:17. Such an unwritten agreement could not successfully have transferred Tolliver’s ownership interest to McCants. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). McCants has waived any other challenge to the

summary judgment award by failing to brief any issues other than those discussed above. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995) (holding, in context of pro se appeal, that issues not raised in appellate brief are abandoned). Accordingly, the challenged judgment is AFFIRMED.