Artur Jan KEDRA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 486 F. App'x 950

SUMMARY ORDER Artur Jan Kedra, a native and citizen of Poland, seeks review of an October 25, 2011 decision of the BIA affirming the December 17, 2009 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Philip Verrillo, which denied his request for a continuance and ordered him removed. In re Artur Jan Kedra, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 25, 2011), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. Hartford Dec. 17, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Where, as here, the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision without opinion, we review only the IJ’s decision as the final agency determination. See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir.2008). This Court reviews the denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. See Sanusi v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 193, 199 (2d Cir.2006).

An IJ abuses his discretion in denying a continuance if: “(1) [his] decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding!;] or (2) [his] decision— though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding — cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549, 551-52 (2d Cir.2006) (first and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). An IJ may grant a motion for continuance “for good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29.

Continuances are not ordinarily granted based solely on a pending labor certification in the absence of additional persuasive factors. See Matter of Rajah, 25 I. & N. Dec. 127, 136-37 (B.I.A.2009) (collecting cases); see also Elbahja v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that, where petitioner’s eligibility for adjustment of status was “speculative,” it was not an abuse of discretion for IJ to deny petitioner’s request for a continuance “in order to permit adjudication of [petitioner’s] pending labor certification”).

Here, the IJ did not abuse his discretion by denying a continuance, as Kedra was not eligible for adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(8) (stating that “any alien [present in the United States] ... who has otherwise violated the terms of a nonimmigrant visa” is ineligible for adjustment of status); Elbahja, 505 F.3d at 129. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED. . Petitioner’s surname is alternately spelled "Kedra” and "Kendra” throughout the administrative record. We use "Kedra” in this Order, as this is the spelling Petitioner used when he filed the instant Petition. .

The BIA did not err or abuse its discretion by granting

summary affirmance. See Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 463 (2d Cir.2006) (providing that this Court lacks authority to review the BIA’s decision to streamline a particular case); Xusheng Shi v. BIA, 374 F.3d 64, 66 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that the BIA’s use of

summary affirmance does not constitute an abuse of discretion); Yu Sheng Zhang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that

summary affirmance does not deprive an alien of due process). . Kedra’s reliance on Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323 (2d Cir.2006), is unavailing. In Thapa, the petitioner would have been eligible to remain in the United States if his request for labor certification had been granted, id. at 335, whereas Kedra conceded that he would be ineligible for adjustment of status whether or not his pending employment-based petition was granted.