G.B., L.B., on behalf of their minor child, N.B., and on their own behalf, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TUXEDO UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant, 486 F. App'x 954

SUMMARY ORDER Defendant-appellant Tuxedo Union Free School District (the “District”) appeals from a judgment entered on August 15, 2011, in favor of plaintiffs-appellees G.B. and L.B., on behalf of their daughter, N.B., and on their own behalf, on their claim for tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., following (1) the district court’s September 30, 2010 order granting plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment and denying the District’s cross-motion for

summary judgment; and (2) the district court’s August 12, 2011 order directing entry of judgment for plaintiffs in the amount of $71,041.25. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues presented for review. We review de novo a district court’s award of

summary judgment in an IDEA case. A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir.2009). In doing so, we recognize that “the role of the federal courts in reviewing state educational decisions under the IDEA is ‘circumscribed.’” Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Muller ex rel. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ., 145 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir.1998)).

Although we must conduct an independent review of the administrative record and make a determination based on a preponderance of the evidence, we must give due weight to the administrative proceedings, mindful that the judiciary lacks the expertise necessary to resolve difficult questions of educational policy. See M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 240-11 (2d Cir.2012).

In determining whether parents who challenge a proposed Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) are entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition, we first ask if the proposed IEP was adequate to “afford the child an appropriate public education.” Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir.1998). If the IEP was not adequate, we then ask whether the private schooling obtained by the parents was “appropriate to the child’s needs.” Id.

An IEP is adequate if (1) the state complied with the IDEA’S procedural requirements, and (2) the IEP is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating an IEP, we must also be mindful of the IDEA’S requirement that disabled children be placed in the “[ljeast restrictive environment,” and educated “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate” alongside their non-disabled peers. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); see also Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 108 (noting the IDEA’S “strong preference for ‘mainstreaming’ ”).

We have conducted an independent and de novo review of the record, and for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough opinion of September 30, 2010, we conclude that (1) the proposed IEPs for N.B. for the 2006-07 and 2007-08 school years were inadequate to afford N.B. an appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment, and (2) the private schooling obtained by plaintiffs was appropriate to N.B.’s needs. We have considered the District’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.