Sami PLLANA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 491 F. App'x 244

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner Sami Pllana, a native of Yugoslavia and a citizen of Kosovo, seeks review of a June 21, 2011, decision of the BIA affirming the July 9, 2009, decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal. In re Sami Pllana, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 21, 2011), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 9, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Because the BIA agreed with the IJ that Pllana was not credible “and, without rejecting any of the IJ’s grounds for decision, emphasize[d] particular aspects of [the IJ’s] decision,” we have reviewed both the BIA’s and the IJ’s opinions. See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005). ‘We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence standard, treating them as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’ ” Xiu Xia Lin v.

Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). “Where the IJ’s adverse credibility finding is based on specific examples of inconsistent statements or contradictory evidence, a reviewing court will generally not be able to conclude that a reasonable adjudicator was compelled to find otherwise.” Id. at 166 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). Because Pllana filed his asylum application in 2008, the REAL ID Act applies. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, 303 (2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii)); In re S-B-, 24 I. & N.

Dec. 42, 45 (BIA 2006). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Pllana did not testify credibly. The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies in the record. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64,166-67. As the agency found, Pllana’s testimony that he called his brother’s friend Mahmut Idrizi for the first time from San Antonio conflicted with his testimony that he called Idrizi for the first time from Laredo.

Pllana argues that he testified that the smugglers who brought him across the United States-Mexico border called Idrizi while Pllana was on his way from San Antonio to Laredo, and that he called Idrizi after he arrived in Laredo. The record, however, reflects that Pllana did, in fact, testify that he, not the smugglers, called Idrizi from San Antonio.

Further, the agency reasonably noted a conflict between Pllana’s and Idrizi’s testimony on the subject of whether, prior to Pllana’s arrival in the United States, Plla-na’s brother and Idrizi ever discussed Plla-na’s difficulties in Kosovo and his travel to the United States.

Although Pllana identifies errors in the IJ’s other inconsistency findings, those errors present no basis for remand, as the BIA did not rely on the questionable findings in dismissing Plla-na’s appeal, and the inconsistencies correctly identified by the IJ, in conjunction with the IJ’s other ground for the determination, were sufficient to support the adverse credibility finding. See Shunfu Li v.

Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.2008) (finding that remand is futile where the Court can confidently “predict that the agency would reach the same decision absent the errors that were made” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (holding that “an IJ may rely on any inconsistency ... in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’ ” supports the determination). The agency’s adverse credibility determination is further supported by its reasonable conclusion that Pllana’s testimony was insufficiently detailed.

Where an applicant gives “spare” testimony, the fact-finder may “fairly wonder whether the testimony is fabricated,” and “may wish to probe for incidental details, seeking to draw out inconsistencies that would support a finding of lack of credibility.” Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 829 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir.2003), overruled on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir.2007).

Here, the agency reasonably concluded that Pllana’s testimony was nonresponsive and lacked details regarding Pllana’s travel to the United States as well as his decision to join the Democratic League of Kosovo (“LDK”). Specifically, the IJ correctly noted that Pllana’s testimony, even in response to further questions from the IJ, contained no details regarding how he met the Mexican smugglers who brought him to the United States. Given the inconsistencies and spare and nonresponsive testimony identified by the agency, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1 )(B)(Hi); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (deferring “to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling”). Finally, although the agency’s adverse credibility finding is dispositive, substantial evidence also support’s the agency’s conclusion that the background evidence provided by Pllana did not support his claim that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in Kosovo because of his membership in the LDK. The U.S.

Department of State report on which Pllana relies describes only election manipulation and irregularities; it does not indicate that LDK members face violence or other mistreatment in Kosovo. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.