Donald P. ROSENDALE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W. Michael MAHONEY, individually and as superintendent of the Millbrook, N.Y. School District, Millbrook Central School District, Defendants-Appellees, Office of School Personnel Review and Accountability of the State Education Department, Defendant, 496 F. App'x 120

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Donald P. Rosendale, pro se, appeals from a judgment granting

summary judgment for Defendants-Appel-lees on his claim, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that he was terminated without due process from his position as a per diem, substitute teacher. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review an order granting

summary judgment de novo and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 821 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom

summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration. See Johnson v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 642 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir.2011) (per curiam).

Rosendale’s notice of appeal lists only the June 3, 2011 order denying his motion for reconsideration; but it recites his intention to appeal from the order “confirming a Magistrate’s [sic].” Since the order confirming the magistrate judge’s report was issued in April 2011-not in June 2011-we construe Rosendale’s notice to appeal both the April 2011 and June 2011 orders. See Shrader v. CSX Trans., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995) (“[W]e construe notices of appeal liberally, taking the parties’ intentions into ac- count.”).

However, this Court lacks juris- diction to consider Rosendale’s argument on appeal that the district court erred (in its February 2009 order) in failing to rein- state his First Amendment retaliation claim because Rosendale did not identify the February 2009 order in his notice of appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B); New Phone Co. v. City of New York, 498 F.3d 127, 130-31 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam). [2] Anindependent review of the rec- ord and the relevant case law confirms that the district court properly granted

summary judgment for the Defendants- Appellees on Rosendale’s procedural due process claim and denied Rosendale’s mo- tion for reconsideration. As the district court concluded, New York law conferred on Rosendale no protected property inter- property interest in his employment as a per diem substitute teacher. The form letter provided to him by the Defendants-Appellees— which notified him of his wage, the procedure for placement on the “Substitute Calling Service” list, and the grounds for automatic removal from that list — was not a contract. Therefore, Rosendale was an at-will employee. See In re Bonnie L.

Barkley, Decision No. 14, 912, 2003 N.Y. Educ. Dept. LEXIS 177, at *6 (N.Y. Educ. Dep’t July 28, 2003); In re Barbara Martin, Decision No. 11,484, 25 Educ. Dep’t Rep. 21, 22 (N.Y. Educ. Dep’t July 12, 1985). As the district court further concluded, the oral assurances allegedly given to Rosendale — that (inter alia) he “would always have a home in the school”—did not give rise to a contractual relationship that would alter Rosendale’s at-will employment status. See Cucchi v. N.Y.

City Off-Track Betting Corp., 818 F.Supp. 647, 652 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (collecting New York cases and concluding that “an employer’s oral assurances that induce a person to work for the employer are not by themselves sufficient evidence of an express agreement to alter the [employee’s] at-will status.”). We have considered Rosendale’s other arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, (1) the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, and

(2) Plaintiff-Appellant’s appeal is DISMISSED insofar as it seeks review of the district court’s order denying reconsideration of Plaintiff-Appellant’s First Amendment retaliation claim.