YESHIVA IMREI CHAIM VIZNITZ OF BORO PARK, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, New York City Department of Buildings, New York City Board of Standards & Appeals, Fire Department of New York, Patricia J. Lancaster, in her official capacity as former DOB Commissioner, Meenakshi Srinivasan, in her official capacity as BSA Chairperson, Robert Limandri, in his official capacity as DOB Commissioner, John Does 1-10, Jane Does 1-10, Defendants-Appellees, 496 F. App'x 122

SUMMARY ORDER Yeshiva Imrei Chaim Viznitz of Boro Park, Inc. (“Yeshiva”) alleges that it is suffering discriminatory treatment at the hands of the City of New York, et al., (collectively, the “City”) regarding operation of a catering establishment in its resi-dentially-zoned building at 1824 53rd Street (the “Building”). It appeals from the July 27, 2011 opinion and order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Baer, J.) granting the City’s motion for

summary judgment on all claims. This Court reviews the district court’s grant of

summary judgment de novo. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir.2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. The district court determined that the claims were barred by collateral estoppel. State law determines the preclusive effect of state court judgments. Marvel Characters, Inc. v.

Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir.2002). “Under New York law, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue when (1) the identical issue necessarily was decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and (2) the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.” In re Hyman, 502 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir.2007) (citations omitted). The district court properly concluded that all five of Yeshiva’s federal claims were precluded by prior state court judgments.

Yeshiva had two full and fair opportunities to litigate its grievances: at the initial

Article 78 proceeding, and then again through its motion for a renewal. Yeshiva’s arguments on appeal are based on the idea that the issues before the district court were different than the ones addressed by the state courts. First, Yeshiva argues that it now conducts its wedding ceremonies in a location different from the one it used at the time of the

Article 78 proceedings. Specifically, Yeshiva moved the ceremonies from the street in front of the Building to “that portion of the roof of the first floor that is formed because the second floor is set back.” Yeshiva argues that this adjustment raises a new legal question because the location of the weddings was a factor in the Department of Building’s (“DOB’s”) accessory use analysis. However, this shift is a distinction without a difference, at least insofar as the collateral estoppel analysis is concerned.

The weddings still take place “outside” the synagogue, which was the critical factor for the Board of Standards and Appeals. Yeshiva’s misconstruction of the City’s inquiry fails to raise a new legal issue that was not previously decided by the state court. Second, Yeshiva claims that it suffered new incidents of discrimination after the conclusion of the

Article 78 litigation. The only new evidence consists of three violations it received from the DOB and Fire Department of New York. But Yeshiva does not show how the issues regarding this later alleged discrimination are distinguished from those previously considered by the state court. All of the evidence that Yeshiva proffers regarding similarly situated institutions was reviewed during the state court proceedings. Yeshiva cites Davis v.

Halpern for the idea that “a continuing course of conduct, if true, often creates a new and separate claim, not barred by the decision in a single prior suit.” 813 F.2d 37, 40 n. 4 (2d Cir.1987) (emphasis added). Yeshiva misconstrues Davis. Collateral estoppel may well be appropriate even if certain facts have changed. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. United Techs. Corp., 706 F.2d 1254, 1259-61 (2d Cir.1983) (applying collateral estoppel, even though some new developments had occurred and res judicata was foreclosed).

Davis says “often,” not “always.” Absent a meaningful, substantive change that alters the legal issue at hand, collateral es-toppel operates. Otherwise, losing state plaintiffs with any claim of ongoing discrimination could simply wait a few days and relitigate in federal court. All Yeshiva points to now are some legally irrelevant factual developments that occurred after the state court decisions.

We agree with the district court that the state court necessarily decided the issues of whether the catering hall was an accessory use and whether the City had discriminated against Yeshiva in ruling that its zoning decisions were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Yeshiva was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues. Collateral estoppel was therefore appropriate. Finally, while the district court’s discussion of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine might be questioned in the wake of the Supreme Court’s limiting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp. decision, 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005), we need not sort that out because it had no bearing on the outcome of the case. Finding no merit in Yeshiva’s remaining arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.