ZEN-HUANG LIU, aka Zenghuang Liu, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 496 F. App'x 152

SUMMARY ORDER Zen-Huang Liu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 19, 2011 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Zen-Huang Liu, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 19, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006).

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Liu’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, as it was his third motion to reopen and he filed it more than eight years after his final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the time limits on motions to reopen may be excused when the movant demonstrates changed country conditions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA reasonably concluded that Liu did not demonstrate changed conditions in this case.

As an initial matter, the record does not support Liu’s contention that the BIA did not consider all of his evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (providing that we will “presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”).

The record supports the BIA’s conclusion that Liu’s general evidence of conditions in China-reports and articles describing the persecution of Christians including the Shouters, a group which the Chinese government considers a cult — did not establish a material change in China because State Department reports indicate that such persecution occurred at the time of Liu’s 2001 merits hearing. See In re S-Y-G- 24 I. & N.

Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A.2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, we compare the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (reviewing the BIA’s factual findings regarding changed country conditions under the substantial evidence standard).

Additionally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to credit the affidavits from Liu and his father based on an immigration judge’s previous finding that Liu was not credible. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir.2007) (the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to credit unauthenticated documents submitted with a motion to reopen where the alien had been found not credible in the underlying proceedings); see also Siewe v.

Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir.2007) (“[ A] single false document or a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Liu’s motion as untimely and number-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Ride of Appellate Procedure 84(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). .

Liu cites the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ghadessi v. INS, 797 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1986), to argue that the BIA should have presumed that his affidavit was reliable. However, that case does not govern in this Court.