YUNLING ZHENG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 498 F. App'x 55

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner Yunling Zheng seeks review of a June 17, 2011, decision of the BIA that affirmed the August 13, 2009, decision of Immigration Judge (“LJ”) Barbara A. Nelson that: (1) denied her motion to change venue; (2) pretermitted her asylum application as untimely; and (3) denied on the merits asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yunling Zheng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 17, 2011), ajfg No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 13, 2009).

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions. See Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Monter v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 546, 558-59 (2d Cir.2005); see also Aliyev v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir.2008).

An IJ may grant a change of venue “for good cause[, which] ... is determined by balancing such factors as administrative convenience, the alien’s residence, the location of witnesses, evidence and counsel, expeditious treatment of the case, and the cost of transporting witnesses and evidence to a new location.” Monter, 430 F.3d at 559 (quoting Lovell v. INS, 52 F.3d 458, 460 (2d Cir.1995) and citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b)).

The agency did not abuse its discretion in finding that Zheng failed to demonstrate good cause for her motion to change venue as it reasonably explained that she did not persuasively demonstrate her new residence, she had previously been granted a venue change, and she admitted that she was in New York several days each month. See id.; see also Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir.2001). We need not reach Zheng’s challenge to the agency’s pretermission of her asylum application as untimely because the agency’s alternative denial of that form of relief was dispositive of her claim.

Zheng sought relief from removal based on her assertion that she fears persecution because she has had more than one child in the United States, which they contend is in violation of China’s population control program and because she is a member of the Chinese Democracy Party (“CDP”) in the United States. For largely the same reasons as this Court set forth in Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir.2008), we find no error in the agency’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief insofar as those claims were based on Zheng’s family planning claim. See id. at 158-72.

Furthermore, the agency did not err in finding that Zheng had not established her eligibility for relief based on her CDP claim because she failed to demonstrate that the Chinese government was aware of, or likely to become aware of, her membership in the CDP. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008). “While consistent, detailed, and credible testimony may be sufficient to carry the alien’s burden, evidence corroborating his story, or an explanation for its absence, may be required where it would reasonably be expected.” Chuilu Liu v.

Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 196-97 (2d Cir.2009) (citing Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 285-86 (2d Cir.2000)). The agency reasonably found that Zheng’s testimony regarding her assertion that authorities were aware of her CDP membership was not sufficiently credible or persuasive to carry her burden of proof and required reasonably available corroborating evidence. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(i). Moreover, the agency did not err in finding that Zheng failed to provide reasonably available corroborating evidence from her mother. See Chuilu, 575 F.3d at 196-98.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, Zheng’s motion for a stay of removal in connection with this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).

We do not consider the government’s contention that we lack jurisdiction to consider the IJ's entirely discretionary decision to deny a motion to change venue, assuming hypothetical jurisdiction to consider Zheng’s challenge to the denial of her motion because the "jurisdictional issues are complex and the substance of the claim is ... plainly without merit.” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 338 (2d Cir.2006).