JIAN RONG CHEN, aka Fangli Shang, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 498 F. App'x 77

SUMMARY ORDER Jian Rong Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 29, 2011, order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Jian Rong Chen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 15, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322-23, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)).

There is no dispute that Chen’s 2010 motion to reopen was untimely because her administrative order of removal became final in 2004. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). To the extent Chen contends that the time limitation does not apply to her motion to reopen because her motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in” China, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), her arguments are unpersuasive.

Chen asserts that she joined the Chinese Coalition for Citizens Rights (“CCCR”) after being ordered removed from the United States, and Chinese officials have contacted her mother about her activities in the United States. However, as the BIA found, her membership in the CCCR was a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2008).

Moreover, the record supports the BIA’s determination that Chen has not established changed conditions arising in China because she failed to provide any objective evidence showing that China’s policies had changed since the time of her hearing. See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007); see also Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir.2006). To the extent Chen challenges the BIA’s finding that the black and white copy of the unsworn, unauthenticated statement from her mother included with her motion to reopen was not persuasive, we will defer to the BIA’s conclusion. See Xiao Ji Chen v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006); Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir.2007). Therefore, given the lack of evidence of any change in China, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Chen failed to demonstrate an exception to the time limitation, and we find no abuse of discretion in its denial of Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); Ali, 448 F.3d at 517. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).