SUMMARY ORDER Defendant-Appellant Tracy Anderson (“Anderson”) appeals from a December 14, 2011 order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Scheindlin, J.) reducing Anderson’s sentence to the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months. The panel has reviewed the briefs and the record in this appeal and agrees unanimously that oral argument is unnecessary because “the facts and legal arguments [have been] adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. Anderson challenges his sentence on the grounds that the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), should apply retroactively to enable the court to sentence him below the statutory mandatory minimum in effect at the time of his original conviction and sentencing. We review a district court’s
interpretation of a statute de novo. See United States v. Williams, 551 F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir.2009). In 2005, Anderson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base (crack) and distribution and possession with intent to distribute more than fourteen grams of crack; the district court sentenced Anderson to 168 months’ imprisonment. In 2009, after the 2007 amendments to the Guidelines, the district court granted Anderson’s motion for a reduction in sentence and sentenced him to 135 months’ imprisonment.
In 2011, after enactment of the FSA, Anderson filed a second motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) seeking to have the district court reduce his sentence to the low end of the revised Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment. The district court reduced Anderson’s sentence to 120 months’ imprisonment, but determined that the court could not sentence Anderson to a term of imprisonment below the statutory mandatory minimum in effect at the time of his conviction and sentencing. We affirm. The FSA does not apply retroactively to defendants who were convicted and sentenced prior to August 3, 2010.
See United States v. Diaz, 627 F.3d 930, 931 (2d Cir.2010) (per curiam). The Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey v. United States does not compel a different result. — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012). In Dorsey, the Supreme Court determined that the FSA’s “new, lower mandatory mínimums [ ] apply to the post-Act sentencing of pre-Act offenders.” Id. at 2335. The Court’s holding does not affect offenders who were sentenced before the FSA took effect.
See id. (acknowledging that application of the new mandatory mínimums to pre-Act offenders sentenced after the FSA’s enactment but not those sentenced before that date “will create a new set of disparities” but concluding that “this particular new disparity ... cannot make a critical difference”). As a result, the revised Guidelines range has no bearing on Anderson’s sentence; the court could not sentence him to a term less than the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment in effect at the time of his conviction and sentencing. See Williams, 551 F.3d at 185-86.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.