Jack J. GRYNBERG, Grynberg Production Corporation (Texas). Inc., Grynberg Production Corporation (Colorado), Inc., Pricaspian Development Corporation (Texas)., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ENI S.P.A., fka AGIP, an Italian Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, 503 F. App'x 42

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiffs-Appellants Jack J. Grynberg (“Grynberg”) and three closely-held companies owned by the Grynberg family appeal from an August 24, 2011 order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.) granting Defendant-Appellee Eni S.p.A.’s (“Eni”) motion for

summary judgment and dismissing Grynberg’s claim for unjust enrichment. The panel has reviewed the briefs and the record in this appeal and agrees unanimously that oral argument is unnecessary because “the facts and legal arguments [have been] adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. We review de novo a grant of

summary judgment by the district court. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 284 (2d Cir.2012). “The basic elements of an unjust enrichment claim in New York require proof that (1) defendant was enriched, (2) at plaintiffs expense, and (3) equity and good conscience militate against permitting defendant to retain what plaintiff is seeking to recover.” Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir.2004). The district court determined that Grynberg’s claim failed because he could not show any relationship, or even any communication, between himself and Eni.

See Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16 N.Y.3d 173, 919 N.Y.S.2d 465, 944 N.E.2d 1104, 1110-11 (2011) (“Although privity is not required for an unjust enrichment claim, a claim will not be supported if the connection between the parties is too attenuated.” (internal citations omitted)). Grynberg challenges the district court’s ruling on the ground that he alleged an “unjust enrichment claim predicated on a misappropriation of trade secrets,” which need not satisfy the traditional elements of unjust enrichment.

The district court correctly ruled that Grynberg did not make a misappropriation of trade secrets claim. The amended complaint identified only one claim for relief and it was entitled “unjust enrichment.” But even had the court considered the merits of Grynberg’s alleged trade secrets claim,

summary judgment for Eni would still be appropriate. Grynberg offered no evidence showing that Eni had notice that information Grynberg claims Eni received through a joint venture was in breach of a confidential relationship. See Restatement of Torts § 757(c) (1939). For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.