Magdy YOUSSEF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HALCROW, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Halcrow Holdings Limited, company organized under the laws of the United Kingdom, Halcrow Group Limited, company organized under the laws of the United Kingdom, Defendants-Appellees, 504 F. App'x 5

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Magdy Youssef, pro se, appeals from the district court’s order dismissing, on the defendants’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, Youssefs diversity complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. “We review the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo, accepting all factual claims in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir.2010).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although all factual allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of the above principles, we now affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in its November 1, 2011 memorandum and order.

Yous-sefs argument on appeal that the district court erred by refusing to credit as true the assertion in his complaint that he was the sole owner of an engineering design “to the exclusion of any other person or entity,” is meritless as that assertion was merely a “legal conclusion[ ] masquerading as [a] factual conclusion[ ],” which is insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Smith v. Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Plan, 291 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir.2002)).

The complaint’s factual allegations belie that legal conclusion as the complaint alleges that when plaintiff was Director of Structural Systems for his employer Tishman, Tishman “requested Plaintiff, Mr. Youssef, to review the Halcrow Defendants’ proposed structural design to see if he could find a solution to the constructability and cost problems” (Complaint ¶ 20), and thus under New York law, as the district court ruled, Youssefs work product belonged to his employer, see, e.g., Pullman Grp. LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. Of Am., 288 A.D.2d 2, 3, 733 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep’t 2001).

Moreover, in assessing the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the district court properly considered an addendum to Youssefs employment application, which Youssef attached as an exhibit to his opposition, as that document was “integral” to Youssefs allegation that he, and not his employer, was the owner of the engineering design. See DiFolco v.

MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir.2010) (holding that a court may consider a document not incorporated by reference into the complaint “where the complaint ‘relies heavily upon its terms and effect,’ thereby rendering the document ‘integral’ to the complaint” (quoting Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir.2006))). We have considered all of Youssef s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.