UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ernestina MARIMON, Defendant-Appellant, 507 F. App'x 5

PRESENT: DENNY CHIN, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges, and JOHN GLEESON, District Judge.

SUMMARY ORDER Defendant-appellant Ernestina Marimon was convicted, following a plea of guilty, of four counts of theft of government benefits, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, and one count of making a false statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. During her plea allocution, Marimon admitted that she had simultaneously rented four federally subsidized apartments in Manhattan, and that she had made false statements at a hearing before the New York City Housing Authority.

The district court (Cote, J.) sentenced her to five concurrent terms of 18 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release, and ordered her to pay $182,597.12 in restitution, $182,597.12 in forfeiture, and $500 in special assessments. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues presented for review. On appeal, Marimon challenges the forfeiture order entered against her.

She argues that forfeiture was not authorized as a matter of law because the federal funds at issue were paid directly from the government to her landlord and she did not personally receive any federal money or property. Marimon does not challenge the restitution order or the amount of the forfeiture order. We review de novo a district court’s construction of a statute. United States v. Mazza-Alaluf, 621 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir.2010).

The forfeiture statute applicable to theft of government benefits provides for the forfeiture of “[a]ny property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to [the] violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D); 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). The statute defines “proceeds” as “property of any kind obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of the commission of the offense giving rise to forfeiture, and any property traceable thereto, and is not limited to the net gain or profit realized from the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(A). In United States v.

Torres, 703 F.3d 194 (2d Cir.2012) — a case which the parties agree involved the same issue presented here — we held that money the defendant saved by having the government pay rent directly to her landlord “constituted property that was obtained ... indirectly as a result of her [violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641], and may also be fairly characterized as proceeds traceable to or net gain realized from her offense.” Id, at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Marimon similarly had $182,597.12 in funds “available for her use only because she ... failed to pay the amount she otherwise would have owed for rent.” Id. at 202. Thus, Marimon “obtained” those funds “indirectly” as a result of her theft of government housing subsidies, and the sum is “traeeable” to that theft. Accordingly, we conclude that the order of forfeiture was properly imposed. We have considered Marimon’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

The Honorable John Gleeson, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. . Marimon's plea agreement contained a general waiver of her appellate rights, with the following limited exception: "[T]he defendant may appeal the imposition of forfeiture as a matter of law (but not the amount, if the amount is less than or equal to $182,597.12), in order to preserve her rights in light of the Second Circuit's pending decision in United States v. Torres, No. 11-1009.”