Omid NODOUSHANI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee, 507 F. App'x 79

Present: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be VACATED AND' REMANDED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART. Omid Nodoushani (“Nodoushani”) appeals from judgment entered on September BO, 2011 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Thompson, J.) granting

summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Southern Connecticut State University (“The University”), on Nodoushani’s claims of: (1) employment discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(

a) et seq. (“CFEPA”); and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant

summary judgment. Mario v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 763 (2d Cir.2002). 1.“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United. States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const, amend. XI (emphasis added). “ ‘Jurisdiction properly refers to a court’s power to hear a case.’” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 165 n. 5, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1246 n. 5, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v.

Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002)). Given that explicit limitation on judicial power, see Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25, 54 S.Ct. 18, 78 L.Ed. 145 (1933), the district court correctly ruled that 'Nodoushani’s state claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. However, those claims should have been dismissed without prejudice in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(

b) because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 2. The district court did not err in striking part of Nodoushani’s Local Rule 56(a)(3) statement. District courts have leeway on motions to strike in the context of

summary judgment motions. While a court is obliged not to consider inadmissir ble evidence at the

summary judgment stage, “[t]o the extent that an affidavit or declaration contains material that does not comply with [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56(e), the [c]ourt may strike those portions, or may simply disregard them.” Rus, Inc. v. Bay Indus., Inc., 322 F.Supp.2d 302, 307 (S.D.N.Y.2003); see also United States v. Alessi, 599 F.2d 513, 514-15 (2d Cir.1979) (holding that the district court may strike inadmissible portions of affidavits). 3. We affirm the district court’s decision with regard to Nodoushani’s Title VII claims for the reasons stated in the district court’s thorough opinion.

Finding no merit in Nodoushani’s remaining arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the-judgment with respect to Nodoushani’s Title VII claims and VACATE the judgment of the district court as to the state claims and REMAND for the district court to enter an order dismissing them for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction without prejudice to such remedies as may be available in state court.