49 WB, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF HAVERSTRAW, Village of Haverstraw Board of Trustees, Trustee Francis J. "Bud" Wassmer, Trustee Francisco Batista, Trustee Rafael Bueno, Trustee Michael Kohut, Trustee Evelyn Rodriguez, John Doe, Jane Doe 1-20, Defendants-Appellees, 511 F. App'x 33

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant 49 WB, LLC (“Plaintiff’) appeals from the district court’s decision, entered on February 7, 2012, granting

summary judgment for the Defendants-Appellees, denying Plaintiffs cross-motion for partial

summary judgment as to liability, and dismissing the complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. We review the grant or denial of a motion for

summary judgment de novo. Huminski v. Corsones, 896 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir.2005). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir.2004). If there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party on the issue on which

summary judgment was sought, then we must conclude

summary judgment was improper. See Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.2004). Plaintiff argues, based on the Appellate Division’s determination regarding the attempted condemnation of Plaintiffs property, that collateral estoppel required the district court to grant

summary judgment on the issue of whether the Defendants acted irrationally and in violation of Plaintiffs substantive due process rights.

We disagree. “Collateral estoppel is permissible as to a given issue if (1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding; (3) the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.” Bear, Stearns & Co. v. 1109580 Ontario, Inc., 409 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). We need look only to the first element to dispose of Plaintiffs argument.

Plaintiff asserts that the Appellate Division’s finding of an “irrational” public purpose in its annulment of Defendants’ condemnation attempt is the same finding required for Plaintiff to prove its substantive due process rights were violated. This is simply incorrect. To show that Defendants’ condemnation of the property at issue rises to the level of a substantive due process violation, Plaintiff must show that (1) it had “a valid property interest” (which is not challenged here), and that (2) the “defendants infringed on the property right in an arbitrary or irrational manner.” Cine SK8, Inc. v.

Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 2007). “For state action to be taken in violation of the requirements of substantive due process, the denial must have occurred under circumstances warranting the labels ‘arbitrary and outrageous.’ ” Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 262 (2d Cir.1999). These labels are associated with “racial animus” or “fundamental procedural irregularity,” for example. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) Our de novo review of the record demonstrates no genuine issue of fact as to whether the Defendants’ actions, viewed as a whole, were arbitrary or irrational.

Indeed, notwithstanding its finding that the Village’s public purpose for the condemnation was irrational, the Appellate Division concluded that there was no evidence of bad faith, noting that “mere allegations of bad faith and suspicious timing, such as those alleged by 49 WB here, do not suffice.” 49 WB, LLC v. Village of Haverstraw, 44 A.D.3d 226, 239, 839 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y.App.Div.2007). Indeed, the Appellate Division also found that Village’s procedures “honored the parties’ rights to notice and due process, were within the Village’s eminent domain jurisdiction, and followed the statutory procedures of EDPL

article 2.” Id. at 240, 839 N.Y.S.2d 127. Furthermore, the Appellate Division’s review of the condemnation’s “rationality” was more circumscribed than that of a constitutional inquiry, considering only “whether there exist[ed] a rational factual basis” for the condemnation and “whether the procedural requirements” were met. See Greenwich Assocs. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 152 A.D.2d 216, 219, 548 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y.App.Div.1989).

This includes whether there was a valid public use, the “public versus private benefits to be realized from the taking,” and “the condem-nor’s good versus bad faith.” 49 WB, LLC, 44 A.D.3d at 238, 839 N.Y.S.2d 127. Because the state court concluded the Defendants showed no bad faith, the remainder of the state court inquiry is substantially dissimilar from an inquiry into whether the Defendants’ conduct violated Plaintiffs substantive due process rights.

Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs argument, a mere determination that there is no rational relationship between the condemnation and a valid public purpose is simply not the equivalent of a showing that the condemnation is arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith such that it rises to a substantive due process violation under the U.S. Constitution. Although the Defendants violated New York law, neither the Appellate Division’s findings in this regard nor Plaintiffs evidence before the district court show that Defendants violated the Plaintiffs substantive due process rights.

We have considered all of Plaintiffs other arguments and found each of them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.