Peter DAO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OPPENHEIMER FUNDS, INC., Defendant-Appellee, 515 F. App'x 31

SUMMARY ORDER UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff-Appellant Peter Dao (“Dao”) appeals from a May 2, 2012 Memorandum and Order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Forrest, J.) granting

summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Oppenheimer Funds, Inc. (“Oppenheimer”). Dao argues that issues of fact exist regarding his discrimination and retaliation claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. We review a district court’s grant of

summary judgment de novo. Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir.2006). Dao’s

Section 1981 claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir.2008) (discrimination claims); Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 720 (2d Cir.2010) (retaliation claims). Discrimination claims brought under the NYCHRL are also analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas framework, but the NYCHRL is to be construed “broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible.” Melman v.

Montefiore Med. Ctr., 98 A.D.3d 107, 112, 946 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep’t 2012) (quoting Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 922 N.Y.S.2d 244, 947 N.E.2d 135, 137 (2011)). For either a discrimination or retaliation claim to survive

summary judgment, a plaintiff must state the relevant prima facie claim and then offer evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the defendant’s legitimate business reasons for its actions were pretext for illegal motivations. Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 138; Fincher, 604 F.3d at 720. For reasons given in its opinion, we agree with the district court that Dao failed to make out a prima facie case of either discrimination or retaliation under

Section 1981 or the NYCHRL. Additionally, the record does not support Dao’s argument that Oppenheimer’s legitimate business reasons for its adverse employment action(

s) against Dao were pretext for unlawful discrimination or were taken in retaliation for protected activity. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. . We note that the First Department in Mel-man also considered the plaintiff’s claim under the "mixed-motive” framework discussed in Bennett v. Health Management Systems, Inc., 92 A.D.3d 29, 45, 936 N.Y.S.2d 112 (2011). Melman, 98 A.D.3d at 112-13, 946 N.Y.S.2d 27. As in Melman, however, we are convinced that the defendant here is entitled to

summary judgment under either approach. Id. at 113, 946 N.Y.S.2d 27.