UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Charles MENSAH, Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Abbey, Brianne Aguinaga, Vivian James, also known as Dep. Supt. James, Derick Adjei, Deborah Aguinaga, David Blackwell, James T. Davis, also known as Mike, also known as Dale, Paula Defazio, Jimmie L. Ford, also known as Kiki, Expunged Defendant, also known as Expunged Defendant, Felix Lawson, also known as Kobe, Darryl Robinson, also known as Keith, Jodi Tirado, Julian Russell, Tamara Ward, Paul G. Warner, Robert Wesley, also known as Wes, Shamika T. Williams, also known as Mika, Douglas Hunt, also known as Rome, Defendants, 515 F. App'x 59

SUMMARY ORDER On February 27, 2012, a jury found Defendant Charles Mensah guilty of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, fifty grams or more of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine, MDMA, and BZP (“ecstasy”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and (2) use of a communication facility in committing, easing, and facilitating commission of acts constituting controlled substance felonies, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

The District Court subsequently denied Men-sah’s motion to set aside the jury verdict and grant a new trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, and to vacate the jury verdict, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, and entered a judgment of conviction. Mensah now appeals, arguing that the District Court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion. We assume familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Mensah contends that the District Court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion because, in his view, the evidence put on by the government was insufficient to sustain his conviction. In substance, Mensah argues that the government failed to prove the existence of its charged conspiracy. According to Mensah, he did purchase ecstasy from one Joseph Abbey for the purpose of distribution, but he had no

part in a separate conspiracy to sell ecstasy between Abbey and several other cooperating witnesses. In other words, Mensah claims that where the government saw one large conspiracy, there in fact existed two separate conspiracies with a common leader. For this reason, Mensah argues that (1) the government failed to prove its conspiracy count and (2) the District Court improperly admitted against him certain evidence relating to Abbey’s transactions with people whom Mensah did not know.

We review de novo the grant or denial of a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 104 (2d Cir.2011). To prevail on an insufficiency of the evidence claim under Rule 29, a defendant bears the “heavy burden” of showing that “no rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Caracappa, 614 F.3d 30, 43 (2d Cir.2010). We review a District Court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v.

Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 137 (2d Cir.2011). “In order to convict a defendant of the crime of conspiracy, the government must show that two or more persons entered into a joint enterprise for an unlawful purpose, with awareness of its general nature and extent.” United States v. Torres, 604 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir.2010). Critically, “[t]he government need not show that the defendant knew all of the details of the conspiracy ... [n]or must the government prove that the defendant knew the identities of all of the other conspirators.” United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir.2008).

Indeed, “[i]n the context of narcotics operations, ... we have held that even where there are multiple groups within an alleged conspiracy, a single conspiracy exists where the groups share a common goal and depend upon and assist each other, and we can reasonably infer that each actor was aware of his

part in a larger organization where others performed similar roles.” United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir.2008) (citation omitted). Construed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence against Men-sah was sufficient to sustain his conviction. During the three-day trial, the government submitted evidence, most notably in the form of recorded telephone conversations between Mensah and Abbey, demonstrating Mensah’s involvement in the conspiracy.

As the District Court observed, a rational juror could conclude from this evidence that Mensah was aware that he was engaged in a large-scale, multi-city operation for the distribution of drugs and that Abbey’s supply of ecstasy was divided among several resellers, of whom Mensah was one. Mensah may not have known the other members of the conspiracy, but this fact does not defeat the government’s case, given its proof of Mensah’s awareness of the general nature and extent of the conspiracy. Torres, 604 F.3d at 65; Huezo, 546 F.3d at 180.

In sum, Mensah has not carried his “heavy burden” of showing that “no rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Caracappa, 614 F.3d at 43. For the same reasons, Mensah’s argument that the District Court erred in admitting evidence of Abbey’s transactions with other conspirators is also without merit. CONCLUSION We have reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal. For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the June 11, 2012 judgment of the District Court.