SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Daniel T. Warren . appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and denying him leave to file a second amended complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. This Court reviews de novo a district court decision dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). See Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997).
Dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). Normally, this Court reviews denials of motions for leave to amend for abuse of discretion, except where, as here, the denial is based on a ruling of law, in which case the Court’s review is de novo. Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir.2011).
After an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Appellant’s amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction and denied Appellant leave to amend for substantially the same reasons articulated by the district court judge in his well-reasoned decision analyzing the amended complaint and the proposed second amended complaint. Our reasoning, however, differs from the district court’s in one key respect.
The district court dismissed Plaintiffs 10th Amendment claim for lack of standing, reasoning that Warren could not demonstrate an injury-in-fact “because the cited IGRA provisions are not violative of the Tenth Amendment.” Whether the challenged provisions actually contravene the 10th Amendment is not itself relevant to the threshold standing inquiry because, “the question whether a plaintiff states a claim for relief goes to the merits in the typical case, not the justiciability of a dispute, and conflation of the two concepts can cause confusion.” Bond v.
United States, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2362, 180 L.Ed.2d 269 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The injury in fact required to support constitutional standing is ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (
a) concrete and particularized, and (
b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ ” Donoghue v. Bulldog Investors Gen. P’ship, 696 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). Here, Warren lacks standing because his claim that IGRA “compelled [state officials] to enter into agreements that are prohibited by state law” amounts to little more than an allegation that his Government is violating the law. See Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (noting that individuals have “no standing to complain simply that their Government is violating the law”). Warren has therefore failed to allege a “concrete and particularized” injury. Donoghue, 696 F.3d at 175. We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.