Mashama HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Brian FISCHER, Commissioner, New York State Department of Corrections, Andrea Evans, George Alexander, New York State Department of Parole, Acting & Former Chairmen, Susanne Mattingly, Parole Officer, Ron Laduca, Parole Officer, Christina Hernandez, Debra Loomis, Lisa Elova, Joseph Crangle, Commissioners, New York State Board of Parole, Defendants-Appellees, 519 F. App'x 56

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-appellant Mashama Hill (“plaintiff’ or “Hill”), proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s judgment dismissing his complaint, which had raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations by defendants-appellees (“defendants”) concerning conditions of Hill’s post-release supervision.

The District Court’s judgment was made pursuant to its authority to dismiss the case of a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii) and 1915A(b), as to claims against some defendants, as well as under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, with respect to claims against the remaining defendants. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review the District Court’s dismissal of Hill’s complaint de novo. See Chase Grp.

Alliance LLC v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir.2010) (noting that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are reviewed de novo); Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that dismissals made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A are reviewed de novo). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. We construe the submissions of a pro se litigant liberally and “interpret [ ] [them] to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the District Court’s judgment substantially for the reasons stated by Magistrate Judge Scott in his thorough Report & Recommendation, dated August 8, 2011 and adopted by the District Court in its entirety. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the February 15, 2012 judgment of the District Court. . We note that Hill has abandoned his claims against parole officers Susanne Mattingly and Ron LaDuca by not raising them on appeal. See Ozaltin v.

Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 371 (2d Cir.2013) (holding an issue not raised on appeal to be waived); LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir.1995) (same). . The District Court concluded that Hill's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) were barred based on two independent grounds; (1) the "favorable termination” rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), and its progeny; and (2) the doctrine of collateral estoppel. On appeal, we affirm the District Court's judgment based on the collateral estoppel rationale, see Ferran v.

Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 363, 365 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that we "may affirm on any basis for which there is sufficient support in the record, including grounds not relied on by the District Court”), as he had a "full and fair opportunity” to litigate his claims before both the Department of Parole and New York state courts, Curry v. City of Syracuse, 316 F.3d 324, 331-32 (2d Cir.2003) (outlining conditions for the application of collateral estoppel).