Yefris NUNEZ, aka Jeffrey Nunez, aka Yefris De Carmen Gatillo, aka Yefris Carmen de Jesus, aka Jeffrey Rodriguez, aka Yefris Rodriguez, aka Jeffrey de Jesus Gatillo, aka Yefris de Jesus Catillo, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent, 522 F. App'x 54

SUMMARY ORDER Yefris Nunez, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, seeks review of a March 8, 2012, decision of the BIA, reversing the January 19, 2011, decision of Immigration Judge (“13”) Steven R. Abrams granting his applications for a waiver of inadmissibility under

section 212(

i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and for adjustment of status. In re Yefris Nunez, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 8, 2012), rev’g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 19, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered the decision of the BIA as well as those portions of the IJ’s decision affirmed on appeal. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). Because Nunez challenges the denial of a discretionary waiver, our jurisdiction is limited to addressing constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B) (limiting jurisdiction to review discretionary denials), (D) (exceptions to jurisdictional limitations), 1182(i)(2) (committing to the Attorney General’s sole discretion the grant of a waiver under § 1182(i)(1)).

Nunez raises questions of law by arguing that the agency erroneously reviewed the IJ’s factual findings de novo and erroneously re-weighed those findings to reach a different discretionary decision. We are not persuaded. The BIA is limited to clear error review only with respect to the IJ’s factual findings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). The IJ’s comment that a waiver would provide Nunez with an opportunity to “turn his life around” did not amount to a factual finding. It was not “[a] determination of what will occur in the future and the degree of likelihood of the occurrence,” Hui Lin Huang v.

Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.2012), but rather a recognition of the obvious: that a waiver would provide Nunez with the opportunity to rehabilitate himself in this country. Alternatively, to the extent the IJ’s comment reflected a finding that Nunez was willing to obtain employment if granted a waiver, the BIA did defer to that finding and considered it as a positive equity. Nunez also asserts that the BIA accepted the IJ’s factual findings in name only, because it could not have reached a different discretionary determination to deny the waiver had it properly deferred to the IJ’s findings.

The BIA, however, does not err when, as here, acting at its own discretion, it recalculates the weight afforded to the same factors examined by the IJ and reaches a different conclusion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (granting the BIA de novo review over the IJ’s legal and discretionary determinations); Noble v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir.2007) (finding no error of law in the BIA’s recalculation of the equities despite accepting the IJ’s factual findings). Nunez’s argument on this point contests the BIA’s discretionary weighing of the equities — a determination we are not permitted to review.

See Noble, 505 F.3d at 78. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.