UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Harilaos APAZIDIS, Defendant-Appellant, 523 F. App'x 17

SUMMARY ORDER Defendant-Appellant Harilaos Apazidis (“Apazidis”) appeals from the district court’s (Gershon, J.) December 23, 2011 judgment entered after a jury trial. Apa-zidis was convicted, from a twenty-five count indictment, of Counts 2-4, making false statements for purposes of influencing a federally-insured financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (“Section 1014”), and Counts 6-25, engaging in monetary transactions with criminally-derived proceeds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (“Section 1957(a)”).

The district court sentenced him to, inter alia, six months’ imprisonment and forfeiture of $800,000 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). During the trial, at the close of the Government’s case, Apazi-dis moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, Fed.R.Crim.P. 29. The district court reserved decision on the motion until the end of the jury trial, after which, in a May 17, 2011 Opinion and Order, the court denied the motion. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review. Apazidis makes a number of arguments on appeal.

First, he challenges the district court’s jury instructions. “When a party challenges a court’s jury charge, this Court reviews the jury instructions de novo and as a whole.” Boyce v. Soundview Tech. Grp., Inc., 464 F.3d 376, 390 (2d Cir.2006). “A jury instruction is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, if the defendant does not object to the charges during trial, we review for plain error, United States v.

Middlemiss, 217 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir.2000), which looks to whether there was “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights” and “(4) [that] seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 667 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Apazidis’s challenge is without merit. With respect to his convictions under

Section 1014, we find that the district court properly instructed the jury that negligence on the part of the federally-insured financial institution in question, Central Credit Union, did not constitute a defense, see United States v. Thomas, 377 F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir.2004), and that Apazidis could still be found guilty even if some of the institution’s officers were aware of the false statements, see United States v. Niro, 338 F.2d 439 (2d Cir.1964). With respect to Apazidis’s

Section 1957(

a) convictions, because Apazidis did not object to the jury charge below, we review for plain error. Apazidis correctly notes that the district court improperly gave the jury a definition of “proceeds” that was not added to the statute until 2009, see Pub.L. No. 111-21 § 2(f), 123 Stat. 1617, 1618 (May 20, 2009), after the conduct for which Apa-zidis was convicted. Before the statutory amendments, “proceeds,” as a term not defined by statute, was given its ordinary meaning. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 511, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008).

We acknowledge, as the Government concedes, that this error meets the first two components of plain-error review. However, we find that the failure to instruct the jury to give “proceeds” its ordinary meaning did not affect substantial rights, because there was not “a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010).

Next, Apazidis renews his argument in his Rule 29 motion that there was insufficient evidence for his convictions. “[W]e review the grant or denial of a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 de novo, considering the evidence as a whole rather than piecemeal and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v.

Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 104 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government means crediting every inference that the jury might have drawn in favor of the government, and recognizing that the government’s evidence need not exclude every other possible hypothesis.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Apazidis’s sufficiency claims are also without merit.

He argues that the Government failed to introduce evidence showing that he knowingly and intentionally made false statements on the loan documents he submitted, as required by

Section 1014. However, the Government showed that Apazidis signed the documents in question, that the one signature alleged to be forged was similar to other uncontested signatures, and that, with respect to certain items offered as collateral, Apazidis did not own most of the items in question. Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence for conviction. With respect to his

Section 1957(

a) convictions, we reject Apazidis’s argument that, because the money used in the transactions for which he was convicted came from repayment of a loan of the unlawful proceeds, and not the original proceeds themselves, the jury could not convict. Next, Apazidis makes several evidentia-ry arguments, which we review for abuse of discretion. Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 163 (2d Cir.2001).

We find that the district court properly excluded evidence of Central Credit Union’s negligence, which Apazidis wished to introduce on cross-examination, as irrelevant to the trial. “Trial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Furthermore, it properly allowed the Government to introduce evidence of Apazidis’s transactions with the loan proceeds, necessary to make out the elements for a

Section 1957(

a) conviction. Finally, Apazidis argues that the district court’s $800,000 forfeiture verdict should be reduced by the approximately $133,000 that he made to the bank in repayment of his loan. As a mixed question of law and fact, we review de novo. Roberts v. Royal Atl. Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 367 (2d Cir.2008).

However, the United States’ right to the proceeds of the fraudulent loan vested when the crime was committed, see 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), and thus the manner in which Apazidis spent these illegal proceeds — even partially repaying the loan before he was indicted — is irrelevant to the amount due to the United States as forfeiture. We have considered all of Apazidis’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.