Habibah ABDUL-HAKEEM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Cara PARKINSON, Corrine McCarthy, Defendants-Appellees, 523 F. App'x 19

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Habibah Abdul-Hakeem (“plaintiff’) began this action before the District Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by two of her supervisors, Cara Parkinson and Corrine McCarthy (jointly “defendants”), at the Connecticut Superior Court. In a well-reasoned opinion of January 26, 2012, the District Court granted

summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed plaintiffs complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review an order granting

summary judgment de novo and “resolv[e] all ambiguities and draw[] all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom

summary judgment is sought.” Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Winfield v, Trottier, 710 F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir.2013). On the record before us, we conclude that the District Court properly granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendants. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Brown v. City of Syracuse,. 673 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of a § 1983 suit where the “color of state law is established, [an] equal protection claim parallels [a] Title VII [employment discrimination] claim.” Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir.2004); see also Demoret v.

Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2006). “To establish a -prima facie Title VII case, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he belonged to a protected class; (2) that he was qualified for the position he held; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Sassaman v.

Gamache, 566 F.3d 307, 312 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A showing of disparate treatment — that is, a showing that an employer treated plaintiff less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside his protected group — is a recognized method of raising an inference of discrimination for the purposes of making out a prima facie case.” Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 493 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The “standard for comparing conduct requires a reasonably close resemblance of the facts and circumstances of plaintiffs and comparator’s cases,” such that “the comparator must be similarly situated to the plaintiff in all material respects.” Id. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted). “An employee is similarly situated to co-employees if they were (1) subject to the same performance evaluation and discipline standards and (2) engaged in comparable conduct.” Id. at 493-94 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The District Court determined that although plaintiff had “identified seven alleged comparators,” she provided “no factual support that a single alleged comparator performed similar job functions, was subjected to the same disciplinary standards, engaged in similar conduct, or was treated more favorably [than her].” Abdul-Hakeem v. Parkinson, No. 3:10cv747 (JBA), 2012 WL 234003, at *5 (D.Conn. Jan. 25, 2012).

Upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that the District Court correctly held that plaintiff failed to establish circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of her race in the absence of any evidence that she was treated differently than similarly situated individuals who were not members of her protected class. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court, substantially for the reasons articulated in its opinion of January 26, 2012. We have considered all of plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the January 26, 2012 judgment of the District Court. . We note that McCarthy, although technically proceeding pro se, has decided to rely entirely on Parkinson's counseled brief, without filing a separate brief of her own.