UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ghulam MESBAHUDDIN, also known as Rumi, Defendant-Appellant, 532 F. App'x 4

SUMMARY ORDER Defendant Ghulam Mesbahuddin was convicted, after a trial by jury, of (1) conspiracy to transfer false identification documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2), (f); and (2) conspiracy to commit bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. In substance, the jury found that Mesbahuddin conspired to obtain and sell a false driver’s license from the California Department of Motor Vehicles. Mesbahuddin now challenges his conviction, principally on the ground that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that he conspired with at least one other person to commit bribery.

We assume familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case. Although we review sufficiency challenges de novo, United States v. Desposito, 704 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir.2013), “a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that led to his conviction at trial bears a heavy burden,” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

That is because we “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government’s favor, and deferring to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility, and its assessment of the weight of the evidence,” United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.2008) (internal citations, alterations and quotation marks omitted), and because we must uphold the judgment of conviction if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Mesbahuddin contends that the government failed to prove that he conspired with another person other than the government’s informant. Mesbahuddin is correct that the government was required to prove that he conspired with at least one other person who was not a government informant, see United States v. Andrades, 169 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir.1999), but he is not correct that the government failed to adduce the necessary evidence.

Though the evidence introduced at trial was not overwhelming, it included, among other things, a recording of Mesbahuddin’s side of a telephone conversation in which Mesbahuddin referred to identification documents and to the “head of the DMV.” See Joint App’x 484-85. Based on this recording, a rational juror could conclude that Mesbahuddin conspired with the other participant in the telephone call-one Mozammel Hoque.

Mesbahuddin nonetheless insists that the District Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it was not sufficient for the government to prove only that Mesbahuddin conspired with the government’s informant. Mesbahuddin did not raise this objection before the District Court, and the District Court’s jury instructions are therefore subject to “plain error” review. See United States v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir.2013); see also United States v.

Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 413 (2d Cir.2003) (“[T]he mere fact that a defendant submitted his proposed language as part of a requested charge does not in itself preserve the point for appeal.”). This standard is met when “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.

Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Even if we were to conclude that the jury instructions were in error, we would have no reason to think that the error was clear or obvious, or that the error affected the outcome of the trial, inasmuch as the evidence demonstrated that Mesbahuddin conspired at least with Hoque, if not others.

Finally, we find no merit in Mesbahuddin’s arguments (1) that the indictment should have been dismissed because the government failed to specify the second conspirator in its opening statement — a proposition for which Mesbahuddin advances no legal support; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to commit bribery, inasmuch as the record discloses ample evidence to demonstrate his intent. CONCLUSION We have reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal. For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the June 25, 2012 judgment of the District Court.