Fredda WEINBERG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF N.Y. INC., Defendant-Appellee, 590 F. App'x 97

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Fredda Weinberg, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee- Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (“ConEd”), dismissing her claims of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and state law. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review de novo a district court’s grant of

summary judgment, which “is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmov-ant. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, Inc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999).

Summary judgment in favor of ConEd was appropriate because the record and case law reveal that, as the district court correctly found, Weinberg was an independent contractor and not an employee of ConEd. See Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 226 (2d Cir.2008) (“Once a plaintiff is found to be an independent contractor and not an employee ... the Title VII claim must fail.”). Furthermore, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Weinberg’s state-law claims.

We have considered Weinberg’s remaining arguments and we find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated herein and in the district court’s decision, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.