Edward LILLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEWISTON-PORTER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, David Schaubert, Louis Palmeri, Robert Laub, and James Mezhir, Defendants-Appellees, 593 F. App'x 87

SUMMARY ORDER On appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant Edward Lilly challenges the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellees David Schaubert and the Lewiston-Porter Central School District. (Skretny, /.). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. We review a grant of

summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawpng] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir.2011).

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rationale trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). Upon such review, we conclude that the district court properly granted

summary judgment to the defendants for the reasons stated in its thorough and well-reasoned memorandum and order. In particular, on review of the record we confirm that the district court properly concluded that the record is bereft of any admissible evidence that defendant Schaubert interfered with plaintiffs ability to register for the training courses required by New York Education Law § 2102-a or that Schau-bert was aware that bringing the removal action when he did was premature.

While the evidence plaintiff points to would support findings that Schaubert harbored animosity toward plaintiff and sought his removal for the failure to take the required classes, it cannot be reasonably construed to support the propositions that Schaubert prevented Lilly from taking the courses or that he was objectively unreasonable in commencing the removal proceedings when he did. Although it entered judgment in favor of the school district, the district court did not separately analyze whether the school district could be liable even if Schaubert were granted qualified immunity.

Because it is clear that the judgment for the school district was appropriate, we affirm nevertheless. See McNally Wellman Co. v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 1194 (2d Cir.1995) (“We need not affirm for the reasons expressed by the district court but may affirm on any ground supported by the record.”). This court has previously recognized that New York school districts “are ‘persons’ within the meaning of [42 U.S.C.] § 1988” and, as such, “are not liable ‘on a respondeat superior theory,’ simply because an employee committed a tort.” Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 116 (2011) (quoting Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Plaintiff does not argue on appeal and has presented no evidence that Lilly’s removal was the result of the “government’s policy or custom.” Id. Moreover, the reversal of Lilly’s removal by the Commissioner of Education demonstrates that Schaubert did not have final policy-making authority regarding the removal. As a consequence, Schaubert’s actions in that regard cannot give rise to liability on the part of Lewiston-Porter Central School District. Judgment in favor of the school district was therefore appropriate.

We have considered all of Lilly’s remaining arguments, including those regarding the exhibits, and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of

summary judgment. . The claims against defendant-appellees Louis Palmeri, Robert Laub, and James Me-zhir were dismissed by an earlier opinion of the district court, which is not challenged on appeal.