Hugo VELAZCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLUMBUS CITIZENS FOUNDATION, John Boden, an individual, Defendants-Appellees, 594 F. App'x 27

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Hugo Velazco appeals from a judgment entered on February 24, 2014 by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, /.), granting

summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs claims of age discrimination under, inter alia, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. On appeal, Velazco contends that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment in defendants’ favor because, according to Velazco, a reasonable juror could have found liability after drawing all reasonable inferences in Ve-lazco’s favor. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues presented for review. This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of

summary judgment, drawing all reasonable factual inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. See Wrobel v. Cnty. of Erie, 692 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2012). Even assuming arguendo the plaintiffs contention that the subordinate bias (or “cat’s paw”) theory of liability also applies to ADEA claims, Velazco’s claim must nevertheless fail. To sustain an ADEA claim, Velazco had to show that animus toward his age was a “but-for cause” of the decision by Columbus Citizens Foundation (“CCF”) to terminate him. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009); Delaney v. Bank of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 167-70 (2d Cir.2014) (affirming

summary judgment where evidence would not “permit a jury to find that age was the but-for cause of the challenged adverse employment action” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).

In this case, no reasonable juror could have concluded that animus toward Velazco’s age was the but-for cause of CCF’s termination decision, both because the subordinate who was accused of animus in fact recommended a two-week suspension rather than termination, and because the ultimate decision-maker found the plaintiffs actions — taking a member’s car out for the apparent purpose of personal shopping— “egregious[ ].” J.Á. 487. We have considered all of the plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court dismissing the ADEA claim is AFFIRMED. . Velazco also argues that the district court erred by failing to analyze Velazco's New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code. § 8-101 et seq., claim separately and independently from his federal and state age discrimination claims. We address this issue in a separate opinion, in which we hold that the district court erred in not analyzing Velazco's NYCHRL claim separately and independently.

Finally, on appeal, Velazco has expressly abandoned his claim under New York state law, which was dismissed in the district court, and which we do not review.