Maria Cecilia ACOSTA-ARANGO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Respondent, 596 F. App'x 39

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner Maria Cecilia Acosta-Arango, a native and citizen of Colombia, seeks review of a July 8, 2014 decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. See In re Maria Cecilia Acosta-Arango, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 8, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to dismiss the petition.

We lack jurisdiction to review final orders of removal and orders denying motions to reopen relating to aliens, like Acosta-Arango, who are removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); Durant v. U.S. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115-16 (2d Cir.2004), except insofar as the petition raises “constitutional claims or questions of law,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Even under the exception, however, we lack jurisdiction unless the claim is colorable. See Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir.2008). Acosta-Arango’s petition raises a question of law: whether

section 511 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 511, 104 Stat. 4978, 5052, which barred relief formerly available under

section 212(

c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for aliens “convicted of one or more aggravated felonies” who have “served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996), applies here, where the alien committed the aggravated felony before

section 511’s enactment but was convicted after its enactment. Nevertheless, that question is not colorable in light of Centurion v. Holder, which holds that “the legal regime in force at the time of an alien’s conviction determines whether an alien is entitled to seek § 212(

c) relief.” 755 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir.2014). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order. We therefore DISMISS the petition for review. . The BIA denied reopening because it found Acosta-Arango's motion untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). In any event, it found reopening unwarranted because Acosta-Arango had failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the

section 212(

c) relief she seeks. Because our recent precedent puts the latter conclusion beyond dispute, we dismiss on that ground without considering the issue of timeliness. ,