Elizabeth A. RICHTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH; O'Connell, Attmore & Morris, LLC; Herbert Barall, Judge, Defendants-Appellees, 600 F. App'x 804

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Elizabeth A. Richter, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of her claims under the Americans "with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.,

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“§ 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Connecticut state law. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002).

The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). We also review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.2005).

Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the District Court correctly ruled that:

(1) Richter’s claims against Judge Herbert Barall are aimed at judicial, rather than administrative, activity and are thus barred by absolute judicial immunity;

(2) Richter’s claims against O’Connell, Att-more & Morris, LLC are time barred;

(3) Richter fails to state a retaliation claim against the Connecticut Judicial Branch (the “Judicial Branch”); and

(4) Richter’s due process and discrimination claims against the Judicial Branch are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that the lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Carp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); see also Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85.

Here, Richter alleges that: (1) the Judicial Branch failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations for her stress and anxiety; (2) she thus had difficulty comprehending and participating in court proceedings, which deprived her of meaningful access to the courts; and (3) the adverse judgments resulting from those proceedings are thus invalid and should be overturned. Reaching the merits on these claims would necessarily have required the District Court to reassess the State Court’s judgments. The District Court therefore properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these claims.

CONCLUSION We have considered all of the arguments raised by Richter on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the March 28, 2014 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. . The court may have erred, in light of the broader definition of disability under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (''ADAAA”), Pub.L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008), in holding that Richter’s alleged impairment was insufficiently permanent to qualify as an actual disability under the statute.

We need not reach this question, however, as Richter’s actual disability claims, like her perceived disability claims, are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir.2006) (providing that this Court may "affirm a decision on any grounds supported in the record”).