Barbara McCOY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MORNINGSIDE AT HOME, and Aging in America, Defendants-Appellees, 601 F. App'x 57

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Barbara McCoy, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment dismissing her action brought under, inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review de novo the district court’s grant of

summary judgment, with the view that “[sjummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999).

Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsu- shita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Upon de novo review, we conclude that McCoy’s claims on appeal that she was dismissed because of her disabilities, that her employer failed to reasonably accommodate her, and that her dismissal was in retaliation for her complaints about her disabilities are without merit, substantially for the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion and order.

See McCoy v. Morningside at Home & Aging in Am., No. (1l-cv-2575 (LTS), 2014 WL 737364, at *3-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2014). McCoy’s remaining arguments on appeal are also without merit. To the extent she argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, such a claim is not cognizable in a civil proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 176 (2d Cir.1981). Her argument that defendants discriminated against her because she filed complaints with the New York State Division of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was not raised below, and is therefore waived.

See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1998). Finally, her argument that the district court erred in barring her from seeking relief in state court is at odds with the text of the district court’s judgment, which explicitly dismissed without prejudice her state law claims. We have considered all of McCoy’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. . McCoy describes her retaliation claim as a Title VII claim. She argues, however, that defendants retaliated against her for complaints related to her disabilities.

Accordingly, we construe her retaliation claim as an ADA claim, rather than a Title VII claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). . We need not reach the merits of McCoy's retaliation claim, as we agree with the district court that McCoy improperly raised this claim for the first time in opposing

summary judgment. See Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir.2006).