Jesyca GREENE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF MIDDLETOWN, NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellee, 606 F. App'x 624

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Jesyca Greene appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cote, J.), dismissing Greene’s claims under the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., against Defendant-Appellee the Enlarged City School District of Middle-town, New York (“Middletown”), alleging that she was terminated from her position on the basis of her disability. We review de novo the district court’s grant of Mid-dletown’s motion for

summary judgment, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2000). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. Greene contends that a comment by the Superintendent of Middletown that she is “one of those poor woe [i]s me types” and a glance toward her amputated arm are probative of discriminatory animus against her on the basis of her disability.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Greene successfully established a prima facie case of discrimination, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Henry v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149-50 (2d Cir.2010) (outlining factors to determine whether a stray remark is probative of discriminatory animus), Middletown presented a list of 13 performance-based, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Greene, thus meeting its burden. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“[I]f the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” (internal quotations marks omitted)). The presumption of discrimination raised by Greene’s prima facie case was rebutted and “dropfped] from the case.” See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Greene has not put forth evidence to rebut Middletown’s non-discriminatory reasons for her termination. Greene does not contend that any of the supervisors who wrote the negative performance evaluations and filed the complaints on which her termination was allegedly based were themselves motivated by discriminatory animus. Nor does she point to other evidence that shows that the reasons for her termination were pretextual.

See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct, 1089 (“[Sjhould the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.”). She only alleges that the Superintendent decided to recommend her termination without having considered the negative evaluations.

But she did not submit any evidence to refute that she had previously met with the Superintendent and that they discussed several issues, including her- performance evaluations, the same which were subsequently cited in the letter explaining her termination. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Superintendent was apprised of the content of the evaluations. Thus, Greene’s evidence is not enough to permit a jury to find that the real reason she was fired was because of her disability. See Slattery v. Swiss Reins. Am.

Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.2001) (“We have repeatedly held that, in the end this burden [as to pretext] rests on the plaintiff....”). The district court properly granted

summary judgment in favor of Middletown. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.