David J. WHELAN, Mary M. Whelan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Judith A. PASCALE, individually and in her official capacity as Clerk of the County of Suffolk, New York; County of Suffolk; David Jannetti; Does, 1-5, Defendants-Appellees, 610 F. App'x 19

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiffs David and Mary Whelan (“the Whelans” or “plaintiffs”) appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Bianco, J.), granting defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 403 (2d Cir.2014). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). 1. Defendants contend that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over the Whelans’ claims. Defendants are incorrect. The Whelans do not “complain[ ] of injuries caused by state-court judgments,” nor do they “invitfe] district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).

The Whelans bring independent constitutional claims, arguing that New York’s notiee-of-pen-dency procedures (codified at N.Y. Civil Practice Law & Rules 6501-6516 (“Article 65”)) are unconstitutional. So the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. See Diaz v. Paterson, 547 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir.2008) (explaining that Exxon Mobil “rendered the Rooker-Feldman doctrine plainly inapplicable” to a similar constitutional challenge to

Article 65). 2. The Whelans argue that the

Article 65 process violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Our Court has already rejected virtually indistinguishable claims, holding that

Article 65 “provides all the process that is due in respect of the claimed property interests at stake.” Diaz, 547 F.3d at 96. A panel of this Court is “bound by the decisions of prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir.2004). 3. The remaining federal claims— brought under the Equal Protection Clause and the Free Speech Clause — were appropriately dismissed for the reasons stated in the district court’s Memorandum and Order. 4.

Having dismissed all federal claims, the district court did not err in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims; in denying as futile plaintiffs’ request to file an amended complaint; or in denying as moot plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify each of defendants’ counsel. For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in plaintiffs’ other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions is DENIED. .

Because there is no defect in subject-matter jurisdiction, we need not consider whether (as the district ruled) a federal court “may bypass Rooker-Feldman to reach the merits of a dispute,” Whelan v. Pascale, No. 13-cv-6998, 2014 WL 4638851, at *4 n. 3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014), notwithstanding that the doctrine eliminates federal subject-matter jurisdiction when applicable, see Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292, 125 S.Ct. 1517.