QIANG WANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent, 611 F. App'x 38

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner Qiang Wang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a July 29, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming a November 8, 2011, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Wang’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Qiang Wang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 29, 2013), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 8, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir.2008).

For asylum applications governed by the REAL ID Act, such as Wang’s, the IJ may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, candor, or responsiveness, and on any inconsistencies in his statements and other record evidence, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163. “We defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

Here, a totality of the circumstances, including inconsistencies and omissions in Wang’s testimony and the record evidence, the IJ’s assessment of Wang’s demeanor, and a lack of corroborating evidence, support the agency’s adverse credibility determination. First, the agency reasonably relied on omissions in Wang’s personal statement when compared with his testimony. Id. at 166 n. 3. Wang testified that when he was arrested in May 2008, statement alleges that the police “did not say anything” before the beating.

Wang further testified that he was interrogated, beaten up, and then beaten again on this occasion, but included only one beating in his personal statement. These inconsistencies provide substantial support for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination because they directly relate to the one significant instance of persecution that Wang alleges. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir.2006). The agency also reasonably relied on omissions in Wang’s corroborating evidence when compared with his testimony.

For instance, Wang testified that his church in China was aware of his arrest, but the church certificate he provided does not mention his arrest. Wang also testified that his mother accompanied him to a dental clinic after the alleged beating, but his mother’s letter does not mention such a visit. Moreover, the IJ reasonably relied on Wang’s demeanor during the merits hearing in finding him not credible. We afford particular deference to the IJ’s assessment of demeanor. Dong Gao v. BIA, 482 F.3d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.2007); Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir.2005).

As the IJ found, Wang failed to provide satisfactory explanations for the multiple inconsistencies between his testimony and the record evidence, stating either that he did not know the reasons for the omissions or that he did not think it was important to include certain information. The IJ found that Wang “did not testify in what [she] would characterize as a candid or forthright manner” during these lines of questioning, and we defer to that finding. The agency also reasonably found that Wang did not meet his burden of establishing an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.

To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant who has not established past persecution must demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A); Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir.2006). To demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant must show both that he subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004).

An applicant can establish the objective reasonableness of his fear of future persecution by either (1) offering evidence that he would be singled out individually for persecution, or (2) proving that a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly situated persons exists in his home country. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir.2007).

Wang does not argue that the Chinese government engages in a pattern or practice of persecuting Christians. “To establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the absence of any evidence of past persecution, an alien must make some showing that authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008).

In light of the adverse credibility finding, Wang has not established that the Chinese government is aware of him, and in light of the government’s evidence that millions of people in China worship at unregistered churches without interference from police, the isolated incidents of abuse of such worship-pers to which Wang points do not establish that the Chinese government will single him out for persecution for practicing Christianity.

Because Wang is unable to establish the objective likelihood of harm needed to make out an asylum claim, he is also unable to meet the higher standard required to succeed on a claim for withholding of removal or CAT relief. Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir.2010). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.