Sukhdeep SINGH, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent, 614 F. App'x 551

SUMMARY ORDER Sukhdeep Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a July 25, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming the January 2, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Sukhdeep Singh, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 25, 2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Jan 2, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We have reviewed the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA “for the sáke of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

For asylum applications like Singh’s, governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “[cjonsidering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility determination on inconsistencies in an asylum applicant’s statements and other record evidence, “without regard to whether” the inconsistencies go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii). “We defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make” such a ruling. Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008) (per cu-riam).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. Preliminarily, in denying relief, the IJ was permitted to rely on Singh’s responses to questions in his credible fear interview.

Contrary to Singh’s argument, the credible fear interview contained the required indi-cia of reliability because: (1) the interview record was a verbatim account of the transcript of Singh’s statements; (2) the interview was conducted through a Punjabi interpreter; (3) the asylum officer explained to Singh the purpose of the interview and the importance of providing full and accurate testimony; and (4) the asylum officer asked questions that were designed to elicit a potential basis for asylum. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725-26 (2d Cir.2009).

The IJ’s findings of inconsistency between Singh’s responses in the credible fear interview and his testimony before the IJ were supported by substantial evidence. At his credible fear interview, Singh stated that he cut his hair because members of the Congress Party in India threatened his life and he had to hide his Sikh identity. However, he testified at the immigration hearing that he cut his hair because he injured himself playing as a child, and had to get stitches.

The agency was not compelled to accept his explanation that he misspoke at his credible fear interview, especially since Singh also stated in his asylum application that he cut his hair in response to threats and to avoid being harmed. Singh also stated at his credible fear interview that he was attacked in India and his left arm was broken. However, at his immigration hearing, he testified that his right arm was broken. Singh testified that he told the asylum officer who interviewed him that he broke his right arm,' and that the officer must have made a mistake in recording his response.

But the IJ could reasonably have declined to credit this explanation. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Moreover, Singh submitted an affidavit from his mother, which stated that his left arm was broken in the attack. Given those inconsistencies, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, as the claims were based on the same factual predicate. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 14 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. . The agency did not err in declining to consider a second affidavit from Singh’s mother, stating that it was in fact his right arm that was broken, because the second affidavit was offered for the first time on appeal to the BIA. See Matter of Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 73-74 (B.I.A.1984). In any event, the additional affidavit merely added another contradictory statement.