Pal KRASNIQI, Dile Krasniqi, Rajmond Krasniqi, Petitioners, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent, 617 F. App'x 45

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioners Pal Krasniqi, Dile Krasniqi, and Rajmond Krasniqi, natives of the former Yugoslavia and citizens of Kosovo, seek review of a May 15, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming an April 28, 2011, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Pal Krasniqi Dile Krasniqi Rajmond Krasniqi Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/075/076 (B.I.A. May 15, 2014), aff'g Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/075/076 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 28, 2011).

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir.2008).

The agency may, “Considering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on inconsistencies in an asylum applicant’s statements and other record evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Pal was not credible. The agency reasonably relied on numerous inconsistencies in the record testimony.

For example, Pal, his wife Dile, and their son Rikard testified inconsistently (in the instant proceeding and in Ri-kard’s separate removal proceedings) regarding whether Rikard rescued Pal by car after Pal’s alleged beating in February 2005 or whether Rikard was out of town at the time and knew nothing of the incident. Pal, Dile, and Rikard also testified inconsistently regarding whether Pal went to the doctor’s house for treatment or the doctor came to their house, and whether Rikard was present for that treatment.

Furthermore, Pal testified that they were first threatened in 1999, Dile testified that they were first threatened in 2001 or 2002, and Rikard testified that they were first threatened in 2004. Dile testified that Pal and Rikard received most of these threats on their cell phones, while Rikard testified that Dile received.all of the threats on their home phone and that he had never personally received a threatening phone call.

The IJ was not compelled to credit their explanation that Pal’s and Rikard’s diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder explained their inconsistent testimony because, as she determined, the inconsistencies were too significant. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.2005). Having questioned Pal’s credibility, the agency reasonably relied further on Pal’s failure to provide evidence corroborating his.specific claims. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007).

Given the inconsistency and corroboration findings, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported’ by substantial evidence, and is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.2006). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.

Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).