MING WEN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent, 624 F. App'x 35

SUMMARY ORDER Ming Wen, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a January 31, 2014, decision of the BIA, affirming the August 1, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ming Wen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A Jan. 31, 2014) offg No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 1, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

For asylum applications like Wen’s, governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “[considering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility determination on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements and other record evidence, “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii). ‘We defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v.

Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008) (per cu-riam). Here, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. The agency reasonably relied in part on Wen’s demeanor, noting that his testimony was at times evasive and unresponsive. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam). That finding is supported by the hearing transcript, The agency’s overall credibility determination was bolstered by implausibilities and inconsistencies in Wen’s statements regarding his Chinese Democratic Party (“CDP”) activities. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.2006); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-66. The agency reasonably found it implausible that, in a single day, Wen learned about the CDP from a flyer, called and then met with its chairman, attended a CDP class, wired money to a CDP member in China, and wrote an

article published on the CDP website. See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66-67 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160,168-69 (2d Cir.2007) (providing that, in the context of an implausibility finding, “speculation that inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if the inference is made available to the factfinder by record facts, or even a single fact, viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary experience.”). Indeed, the implausibility of this account was borne out by Wen’s later inconsistent testimony that these events did not occur in a single day.

Wen did not provide a compelling explanation for his inconsistent testimony. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Finally, in light of its credibility findings with respect to Wen, the agency reasonably found that his wife’s unsworn letter was entitled to limited weight and thus failed to rehabilitate his testimony. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006).

Given the demeanor, inconsistency, implausibility, and corroboration findings, the totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. That determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief as those claims are based on the same factual predicate. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.2006). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).