YUT CHIN HOO, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent, 632 F. App'x 634

SUMMARY ORDER Petitioner Yut Chin Hoo, a native and citizen of Malaysia, seeks review of a June 2, 2014, decision of the-BIA affirming an August 20, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Hoo’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yut Chin Hoo, No. A099 072, 761 (B.I.A. Jun. 2, 2014), aff'g No. A099 072, 761 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 20, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The applicable standards of review are well established. See Yanqin Weny v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). As Hoo failed to challenge the denial of CAT relief before the BIA and this Court, her CAT claim is waived. Karaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir.2006); Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005).

Although Hoo challenges the agency’s determination that her asylum application is time barred, we need not consider this claim because the agency also denied asylum and withholding of removal on the merits, and the latter is dispositive. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

Hoo seeks relief based on her conversion • to Christianity in the United States and belief that she will be persecuted if she returns to Malaysia because she is a missionary and the Malaysian government prohibits the conversion of Muslims, ' In the absence of past persecution, there is no presumption of future persecution. Hoo argues that she can demonstrate a well-founded fear by showing that Malaysia has a pattern or practice of persecuting those similarly situated to her. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).

The BIA has provided that “a ‘pattern or practice’ of persecution is one that is ‘systemic, pervasive, or organized,’” and we have “deemed that standard ‘a reasonable one’ while at the same time seeking clarification from the BIA as to how the standard might be applied reliably.” Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737 (BIA 2005).) When the agency’s determination that an individual has not established a pattern or practice of persecution is supported by background materials, the agency has provided a “sufficient basis” for its conclusion. Santoso v.

Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir.2009). Hoo primarily relies on the 2011 International Freedom Report for Malaysia in arguing that she can establish a pattern or practice of persecution of Christians who try to convert Muslims.

Specifically, she argues that this report establishes that “Malaysian officials and the general populace have demonstrated that they will enforce the laws against apostasy and proselytization.” In support, she notes that there was a raid on a Christian meeting on suspicion that the Christians were preaching to Muslims, and there was a rally of 5,000 Muslims who supported restrictions on the proselytization of Muslims. However, one raid on a Christian gathering and one Muslim rally do not establish persecution that is “systemic, pervasive, or organized.” Mufied, 508 F.3d at 93.

And the report does not discuss how Christians are treated if they attempt to convert Muslims. Thus, the BIA’s determination that Hoo failed to show that there is a “pattern or practice of persecution of Christian missionaries in Malaysia” is supported by the record. Santoso, 580 F.3d at 112. Because Hoo has not met the standard for asylum, she cannot meet the standard for withholding of removal. See, e.g., Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir.2010). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 13, 34.1(b).