UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James DOUCHETTE aka JIG, aka Jigga, Santiago Ciprian, aka Wally, Waldemar Gonzalez, aka Vic, Eric Richards, aka E.B., Kamias Smith, aka Killer, aka Kamius Smith, David Rodriguez, aka Ant, Jayson Davidson, aka Boogie, David Mason, aka Gussie, aka C, Gail Brown, RigoBerto Arvizu, aka Rigo, aka Rico, Defendants, Alton Majors, aka Streets, Defendant-Appellant, 674 F. App'x 102

SUMMARY ORDER Defendant-appellant Alton Majors appeals from the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We review de novo “whether [a defendant’s] sentence was ‘based on a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission,’ ” a prerequisite for a defendant’s eligibility for a sentence reduction. United States v. Main, 579 F.3d 200, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.

Williams, 551 F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir. 2009)). “When a defendant is eligible for resentencing, ‘we review a district court’s decision to deny a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion.’ ” United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Borden, 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009)). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

The Supreme Court has set out a two-step approach for district courts to follow when resolving a motion to reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2): At step one, § 3582(c)(2) requires the court ... to determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the reduction authorized. ... At step two of the inquiry, § 3582(c)(2) instructs a court to consider any applicable [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(

a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by reference to the policies relevant at step one is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). To the extent the district court denied Majors’s motion at the first Dillon step, we vacate and remand for further factfind-ing. “[District courts in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings cannot make findings inconsistent with that of the original sentencing court.” United States v.

Rios, 765 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Woods, 581 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 2009)). When the district court denied Majors’s sentence reduction motion, it stated that “the guideline remains unchanged at 97 to 121 months” because, at his original sen-fencing, Majors had not objected to a finding that he was responsible for the “high end” of a range of 150 to 500 grams of cocaine base. Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), United States v. Majors, No. 6:10-cr-06058-CJS-JWF (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2015), EOF No. 419.

At his original sentencing, Majors expressly agreed that he was responsible for more than 196 grams of cocaine base. See Joint App. 88-89. However, under the version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines in effect at Majors’s original sentencing, Majors’s base offense level of 30 could have been calculated based on a finding of either 196 to 280 grams or 280 to 840 grams of cocaine base. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Supp. § 2Dl.l(c)(4)-(5) (U.S.

Sentencing Comm’n 2010) (setting a base offense level of 30 for 196 to 280 grams of cocaine base and a base offense level of 32 for 280 to 840 grams of cocaine base); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2Dl.l(a)(5)(B)(i) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2010) (decreasing base offense level of 32 by two if defendant receives a mitigating role adjustment, as Majors did); Joint App. 89-91. This ambiguity is compounded by the fact that, on appeal, the government concedes that Majors’s original sentence was based on a range of 196 to 280 grams of cocaine base.

Majors would be eligible for a sentence reduction if the 2014 Guidelines were applied to this range and other aspects of his Guidelines calculation remained the same. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2Dl.l(c)(6) (U.S, Sentencing Comm’n 2014). In light of these ambiguities, further factfinding by the district court, or at least a clarification of existing factfinding, is necessary in order to determine Majors’s eligibility for a sentence reduction. • To the extent the district court denied Majors’s motion at the second Dillon step, we vacate and remand for the district court to discuss the § 3553(

a) factors that must be considered when resolving a sentence reduction motion for which a defendant is eligible. When a district court denies a sentence reduction motion at Dillon step two, it must “provide, at a minimum, enough explanation of how it exercised its sentencing discretion to permit meaningful appellate review.” Christie, 736 F.3d at 196. In the present case, although the district court invoked its discretion to decide Majors’s motion, the district court did not discuss any § 3553(

a) factors. See Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), United States v. Majors, No. 6:10-cr-06058-CJS-JWF (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2015), ECF No. 419. We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments on appeal and find in them no basis for altering our decision. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.