Robert BOLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sergeant Dmitry DURETS, (first name unknown) 61st Precinct, Police Offcer Dexter Deonarinesingh, John Doe # 1, Desk Officer, 61st Precinct, John/Jane Does, #210 (61st Precinct), Defendants-Appellees, Albert Devito, Carol Zeitler, Honourable Guy Mangano, Honourable Martin Murphy, Kings County District Attorney's Office, Esq. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Esq. Lisa Marie Vellucci, District Attorney, Assistant District Attorney, (Pretrial ADA Name), Defendants, 687 F. App'x 40

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Robert Boley, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against defendants-appellees Sergeant Dmitry Durets and Officer Dexter Deona-rinesingh for false arrest and malicious prosecution in connection with his state criminal proceedings. The district court granted the defendants-appellees’ motion for

summary judgment, dismissing Boley’s claims against Durets and Deonarinesingh for Boley’s failure to establish their personal involvement in the acts alleged in the Complaint. Boley argues that, although Durets and Deonarinesingh were not involved in his arrest or in the initiation of proceedings against him, they participated in his prosecution by testifying falsely about their roles in his arrest in order to protect other police officers. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review de novo a district court’s grant of

summary judgment. Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

Summary judgment must be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When determining whether a genuine dispute exists, “we must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences against the moving party.” Garcia, 706 F.3d at 127. A party, however, cannot overcome

summary judgment by relying on “mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts” because “conclusory allegations or denials ... cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact where none would otherwise exist.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995)). To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show the defendants’ personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994).

Upon review of the arguments raised by Boley in his appellate brief, we determine that he has waived any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of his false arrest claim: he confirms in his brief that the defendants “had nothing whatsoever to do with [his] arrest.” See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2005) (“ [Arguments not made in an appellant’s opening brief are waived.... ”); LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that a pro se appellant abandons an issue not raised in his appellate brief).

Boley has not, however, waived review of the dismissal of his malicious prosecution claim. To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must satisfy four elements, including that the defendant initiated the plaintiffs prosecution. Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). To initiate a prosecution, “a defendant must do more than report the crime or give testimony. He must play an active role in the prosecution, such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities to act.” Id. at 163 (internal citation, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).

Liberally construing Boley’s brief, he asserts that the defendants participated in his prosecution by lying about the role they played in his arrest by giving perjurious testimony and incorrectly identifying Deonarinesingh as the arresting officer to protect other police officers. While false statements by the police in connection with a criminal proceeding may sometimes give rise to a malicious prosecution claim, see Manganiello, 612 F.3d at 163, Boley has failed to meet his burden in this case.

He has not offered any explanation, or introduced any evidence, to establish that the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations played any role in his criminal prosecution. Even if Officer Deo-narinesingh was incorrectly identified as Boley’s arresting officer at trial, it is not clear how this misrepresentation furthered the state’s case against him. Boley’s con-clusory alleagtions alone are insufficient to survive a motion for

summary judgment. We have considered Boley’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. . There were ten Doe defendants who were dismissed in the

summary judgment order for failure to identify and serve them, and who are mentioned in the caption of Boley’s notice of appeal. As Boley makes no argument about the Does in his brief on appeal, we regard his claims against them as abandoned. See, e.g., Day v. Morgenthau, 909 F.2d 75, 76 (2d Cir. 1990); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8).